University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Summer 2009

Aspects of Experiences: The Role of Novelty in Retrospective
Summary Assessments
Rajesh Prakash Bhargave
University of Pennsylvania, rajeshb@wharton.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Marketing Commons

Recommended Citation
Bhargave, Rajesh Prakash, "Aspects of Experiences: The Role of Novelty in Retrospective Summary
Assessments" (2009). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 27.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/27

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/27
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Aspects of Experiences: The Role of Novelty in Retrospective Summary
Assessments
Abstract
Many consumption episodes involve experiences that extend over time or comprise sequences of
outcomes. Whether leisure activities, shopping visits, or service encounters, extended experiences vary in
their novelty for consumers. While past work has studied the role of novelty in how episodes are
experienced, in this dissertation I ask: How does the novelty of an experience impact its retrospective,
overall evaluation? Previous research on the snapshot model observed that overall evaluations are based
on only the most accessible snapshots of experiences. This past work largely focused on accessibility
differences arising from serial positioning and intensity, whereas novelty stems from differences on
stimulus or conceptual characteristics. In this dissertation, while demonstrating that novelty influences
accessibility in overall evaluations, I also show that novelty’s effect depends on the timing and type of
evaluation. As a basic effect, I find that novelty enhances the accessibility of affective experience:
Aspects that are normally under-weighted in overall evaluations have a larger influence if these aspects
are novel. Further, studying overall evaluations of affect at different points in time, I find that aspects that
regularly influence immediate evaluations are more likely to impact delayed evaluations if these aspects
are novel. Examining different evaluation types, I show that novelty has opposite effects for informational
evaluations: Retrospective judgments of attribute quality levels are more accurate when an experience is
common versus when it is unique—an effect driven by learning advantages that accrue through
accumulated experience. Finally, I distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity by showing that novelty varies
based on the number of past direct experiences but not indirect experiences (e.g., verbal descriptions of
episodes) in a domain. Taken together, these findings augment our understanding of overall evaluations
and explicate novelty. This dissertation also unites the snapshot model literature with other work on
memory, learning, and affect.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Marketing

First Advisor
Gal Zauberman

Keywords
novelty, snapshot model, overall evaluation, remembered affect, hedonic psychology

Subject Categories
Marketing

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/27

ASPECTS OF EXPERIENCES: THE ROLE OF NOVELTY IN
RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY ASSESSMENTS

Rajesh Bhargave

A DISSERTATION
In
Marketing

For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2009

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I offer my most heartfelt thanks to Gal Zauberman, a truly remarkable advisor—
always patient and always encouraging. Gal has taught me many lessons about
scholarship, and he has challenged me to go “above and beyond” in my contributions.
The academic values he has instilled will stay with me throughout my career.
Special thanks also go to the remaining members of my dissertation committee:
Deborah Small, Wes Hutchinson, and Paul Rozin. No one is a better audience for ideas
than Deborah, who has guided me on both research and professional dimensions. Wes is
pleasant and humble, but he is also a walking encyclopedia of knowledge. If I spoke with
him long enough, I could safely cite “Hutchinson (private communication)” rather than
the list of publications referred to in the works cited. Paul’s colorful personality is only
paralleled by his curiosity. My taste for chocolate and cheese will be forever based on
Paul’s influence.
A stellar set of faculty and doctoral students provided feedback on this
dissertation and helped me throughout my doctoral studies. Patti Williams has supported
the students in innumerable ways. The doctoral cube-plex will be sorely missed as a
source of welcome distraction, and I made many life-long friends there. S. Sajeesh has
been a particularly handy cube neighbor.
The studies reported in this dissertation could not have been collected without the
tireless efforts of the Wharton behavioral lab group, headed by Daniela Lejtneker. Young
Lee helped in the technical aspects of the studies, and <b><u>all</u></b> of my
programming knowledge comes as a result of his tutelage. Thank you to our staff for
boosting my productivity, and for always keeping the snacks stockpiled in the kitchen to
keep me going.
Foremost, I thank my family. Tapan and Lakshmi, you have been with me
throughout, inspiring your little brother. Saatvik and Neeru, more recent additions to the
family, have enriched my life in many ways. Aii and Baba, thank you for all the
sacrifices you have made and for your faith in me. You may not have provided any
feedback on this manuscript, and to secure my reputation as a kind son I won’t require
that you read the remaining 146 pages. Nonetheless, your love is reflected in every word
written here.

iii
ABSTRACT
ASPECTS OF EXPERIENCES: THE ROLE OF NOVELTY IN
RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY ASSESSMENTS
by Rajesh Bhargave
Gal Zauberman, Advisor

Many consumption episodes involve experiences that extend over time or comprise
sequences of outcomes. Whether leisure activities, shopping visits, or service encounters,
extended experiences vary in their novelty for consumers. While past work has studied
the role of novelty in how episodes are experienced, in this dissertation I ask: How does
the novelty of an experience impact its retrospective, overall evaluation? Previous
research on the snapshot model observed that overall evaluations are based on only the
most accessible snapshots of experiences. This past work largely focused on accessibility
differences arising from serial positioning and intensity, whereas novelty stems from
differences on stimulus or conceptual characteristics. In this dissertation, while
demonstrating that novelty influences accessibility in overall evaluations, I also show that
novelty’s effect depends on the timing and type of evaluation. As a basic effect, I find
that novelty enhances the accessibility of affective experience: Aspects that are normally
under-weighted in overall evaluations have a larger influence if these aspects are novel.
Further, studying overall evaluations of affect at different points in time, I find that
aspects that regularly influence immediate evaluations are more likely to impact delayed
evaluations if these aspects are novel. Examining different evaluation types, I show that
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novelty has opposite effects for informational evaluations: Retrospective judgments of
attribute quality levels are more accurate when an experience is common versus when it
is unique—an effect driven by learning advantages that accrue through accumulated
experience. Finally, I distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity by showing that novelty
varies based on the number of past direct experiences but not indirect experiences (e.g.,
verbal descriptions of episodes) in a domain. Taken together, these findings augment our
understanding of overall evaluations and explicate novelty. This dissertation also unites
the snapshot model literature with other work on memory, learning, and affect.
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I.

Introduction

An inquisitive visitor touring the marketplace would find people engrossed in extended
experiences: An art collector appreciates a series of paintings at a gallery, a crowd
gathers to watch a percussion concert on the street, and new parents browse through
several baby items at a specialty store. The outsider’s visit to the marketplace comes from
a cross-sectional angle, viewing each person seemingly paired with one experience. In
contrast, for the consumers being observed, their current experience is one of many
consumption episodes that they have engaged in. The experience may be a regular
activity, or it may be novel—perceived as unlike anything ever ventured. Memories of
past episodes may strengthen their understanding of the present, or they may interfere,
ultimately influencing how the experience is evaluated retrospectively. This dissertation
addresses these issues in consumers’ evaluations of extended experiences.

Consumption episodes of many types, including leisure activities, shopping visits, and
service encounters, regularly extend over time or comprise sequences of outcomes.
Consumers experience affective reactions and learn attribute information during these
episodes. For instance, when visiting an art gallery a consumer would enjoy each painting
at different levels, and he would learn about the artists who created these paintings. As I
argue in this dissertation, memory for such an extended experience will depend on its
novelty. In this dissertation, I control for the effect of novelty on how episodes are

2
experienced and attended to as they unfold, and I focus on the effect of novelty on how
episodes are evaluated retrospectively.

Novelty can be a powerful motivator for consumers as they seek out or avoid novel
experiences. Novelty also varies across episodes and over time through consumers’ trial
of new offerings and accumulation of experiences. I draw on both the psychology and
consumer behavior literature in defining novelty: The novelty of an experience inversely
relates to the number of prior, relevant experiences and the similarity of those past
experiences to the focal experience. I study novelty as a source of memorial differences,
investigating episodes that are entirely novel (e.g., when a consumer has never eaten a
meal from an exotic cuisine) as well as episodes in which only aspects of the episode are
novel (e.g., when one dish in a meal is considered exotic). Importantly, I distinguish
novelty from related constructs, such as affective intensity and unfamiliarity,
demonstrating how they yield different outcomes on overall evaluations. In sum, one goal
of this research is to explicate novelty using overall evaluations as a framework.

Further, the present investigation compares global evaluations of experienced affect with
judgments of attribute quality levels. This distinction has also been addressed in the past
literature, including work discussing memory for sensory experiences versus memory for
market information (Shapiro and Spence 2002) and research examining differences
between hedonic versus informational evaluations of extended experiences (Zauberman,
Diehl, and Ariely 2006). Conceptually, these characteristics differ in that experienced
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affect is based on subjective impressions and feeling states, whereas attribute quality
levels are extracted from external sources. Consequently, the novelty of an experience
may also have different implications on overall evaluations depending on the type of
characteristic evaluated. The role of prior experience in memory for attributes has been
discussed in the literature on consumer learning, whereas this dissertation focuses on how
novelty influences affective evaluations. Thus, another objective of this research is to
enhance extant theory on overall evaluations of experienced affect while also linking this
research stream to that on consumer learning.

Because the present research investigates memories for episodes, an additional factor
studied is the length of delay between an episode and its overall evaluation. Delayed
evaluations are of interest in this dissertation, because consumers’ decisions to repeat
experiences are likewise delayed in many consumption domains. This work underscores
the importance of delayed judgments, both because they differ from immediate
judgments and because they are prevalent.

Through five studies, I demonstrate how novelty influences overall evaluations. As a
basic effect, I find that novelty enhances the accessibility of affective experience: Aspects
that are normally under-weighted in overall evaluations have a larger influence if these
aspects are novel. Further, studying overall evaluations of affect at different points in
time, I find that aspects that regularly influence immediate evaluations are more likely to
impact delayed evaluations if these aspects are novel. Novel experiences are distinctive
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even when compared to a broad history of accumulated experiences, leading to
accessibility advantages that are particularly evident after a delay. This temporal
interaction suggests that the basis of evaluations may shift systematically over time,
driven by the experience’s novelty. Examining different evaluation types, I show that
novelty has opposite effects for informational evaluations: Retrospective judgments of
attribute quality levels are more accurate when an experience is common versus when it
is unique—an effect driven by learning advantages that accrue through accumulated
experience. Finally, I distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity by showing that novelty
varies based on the number of past direct experiences but not indirect experiences (e.g.,
verbal descriptions of episodes) in a domain.

Before elaborating on these findings, I first turn to a comprehensive literature review,
which will also illuminate the motivation for this research question and the hypotheses
tested. I primarily draw on two literatures: the snapshot model in overall evaluations of
extended experiences, and novelty in memory, learning, and affect. These literature
streams are disjointed, but they share several features that result in a friendly partnership.

II.

The snapshot model literature

A. Historical sketch and motivation
With increasing attention devoted to the role of affect in decision making and subjectivewell being, many authors studied overall evaluations of extended experiences. This
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research stream, known as the ‘evaluation-by-moments’ paradigm or ‘snapshot model,’
investigated how people remembered the overall pain, unpleasantness, enjoyment, and
other affective dimensions of experiences that extended over time or comprised
sequences of outcomes. These evaluations have been labeled as ‘global evaluations’,
‘overall evaluations’, or ‘remembered affect’ in past work, and they have the common
characteristics that such assessments are retrospective (i.e., evaluated after the experience
has concluded) and summarized (i.e., one evaluation for the entire experience). The
snapshot model is based on the premise that remembered overall affect may not
correspond to a simple averaging or summing of affective intensity. Instead, a set of
principles can account for discrepancies between experienced and remembered affect.
Although the thrust of this research took place from the early 1990s and onwards, the
body of work was grounded in much older psychology literature, such as Gestalt
psychology and psychophysical perception.

The interest in retrospective, global evaluations of extended experiences was motivated
by the heavy reliance on these overall evaluations in judgment and decision making.
Kahneman et al. (1993) found that people’s choices adhered to remembered affect rather
than experienced affect when the two forms of affect were in conflict. Specifically,
participants submerging their hand in ice-cold temperature were more willing to repeat
the affective experience they judged retrospectively to be less painful than to repeat the
experience their on-line measures revealed to be less painful. Wirtz et al. (2003)
replicated this finding in the domain of vacations.
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Overall evaluations not only are considered in decisions, but also they impact future
utility streams through remembrance (Elster and Loewenstein 1992). When people
engage in nostalgia or when they experience painful memories, they rely on distorted
views of past experiences biased by their later assessments (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1997).
People derive happiness and meaning by looking back at certain types of past
experiences, suggesting that utility from remembrance is a significant outcome in its own
right (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003; Zauberman, Ratner, and Kim 2009).

B. Theory and past findings
According to the snapshot model, when people evaluate an experience retrospectively
they do not replay the entire experience like a film. Instead, they retrieve a few key
characteristics or snapshots of the experience. This snapshot metaphor was borrowed by
Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) from Kundera’s (1991) fiction novel Immortality.
Abbreviated memory of experiences often leads to duration neglect, in which the duration
of an experience minimally influences overall evaluations (see Ariely, Kahneman, and
Loewenstein 2000 for a review of duration neglect). More generally, this simplified
representation of a past experience results in people forming overall evaluations based on
a summary of the experience that may not reflect average of moment-to-moment
affective intensity.
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Although past work has consistently portrayed overall evaluations as reflecting limited,
summary assessments, there is less coherence in the literature in pinpointing the gestalt
characteristics of experiences that influence overall evaluations. Here ‘gestalt
characteristics’ refer to the defining features of the whole experience, akin to gestalt in
form perception (e.g., Koffka 1922). One highly cited, stylized fact from this paradigm is
the peak-end rule, which states that the peak intensity and end intensity heavily influence
overall evaluations, and the average of on-line affective intensity provides little
explanatory power when included in a regression model with the peak and end intensity
(Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993, Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996). The peak-end rule
has been replicated in a number of settings, including pain from experimentally-induced
episodes, medical procedures, and medical conditions (Ariely 1998; Kahneman et al.
1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Redelmeier, Katz, and Kahneman 2003; Stone et
al. 2000), annoyance from unpleasant sounds and television signal impairment (Ariely
and Loewenstein 2000; Ariely and Zauberman 2000; Hands and Avons 2001; Schreiber
and Kahneman 2000), satisfaction from service encounters (Verhoef, Antonides, and de
Hoog 2004), and enjoyment for pleasant film clips, television advertisements, and music
(Baumgartner, Sujan, and Padgett 1997; Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993; Rozin, Rozin,
and Goldberg 2004).

While the peak-end rule continued as a subject of inquiry, subsequent work also
uncovered different determinants of overall evaluations. This research has shown that
other gestalt characteristics, including the start, local peaks and troughs (Rozin et al.
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2004), the timing of peaks (Baumgartner et al. 1997), the final trend, the overall trend,
and the rate of change may also heavily influence overall evaluations (see Schreiber and
Kahneman 2000 for a list of hypothesized and supported effects). Ariely and Carmon
(2000) categorize these gestalt characteristics into two broad strokes: “configural aspects
of the experience” and “transient state at key moments.” Previous researchers have also
suggested the possibility of other important moments in experiences. For instance, Ariely
et al. (2000) conjecture, “that for many experiences, the most important feature may be
the aspects of the experience that give it meaning.”

Not only have authors proposed different gestalt characteristics as being central to overall
evaluations, but also empirical evidence reveals that a given gestalt characteristic may not
always have a privileged status. A number of investigations demonstrated muted effects
of peak, end, or trend, but these non-significant effects may be explained by differences
in task characteristics. For example, Rode, Rozin, and Durlach (2007) in investigating
sequences in meals found no evidence of peak, primacy, or recency effects, though they
did observe duration neglect. Their muted effect of peak possibly stems from the lack of
peakedness of the distribution (i.e., kurtosis) of affective intensity. Similarly, Schreiber
and Kahneman (2000) did not find consistent trend effects, but they varied a number of
other aspects of the experience which resulted in a less than ideal test of trend.

More importantly, researchers have identified boundary conditions to overall evaluation
heuristics through theoretically informed moderators. A number of authors discussed the
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relative weighting of peak versus end intensity. Fredrickson (1991) found that when
endings were not known, end intensity contributed little to overall evaluations, suggesting
that the end effect is not fully explained by recency. On the other hand, Carmon and
Kahneman (1996) and Ariely and Carmon (2000) found that when the end outcome is the
focus of the experience, such as when experiencing an unpleasant wait in a queue, the
end is the only important characteristic, and peak intensity does not influence overall
evaluations. Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) showed that a simple peak-only rule is a
parsimonious predictor for explaining overall evaluations for unpleasant stimuli, whereas
the peak-end rule is more appropriate for pleasant stimuli. Finally, Branigan et al. (1997)
found that when people are expecting to re-experience an aversive episode peak intensity
alone characterizes overall evaluations.

Additional observations of moderated effects concern other gestalt characteristics, such
as the trend of the hedonic profile. Ariely and Zauberman (2000, 2003) show that the
effect of trend on overall evaluations depends on the cohesiveness of the experience, with
partitioned experiences exhibiting less pronounced or non-existent trend effects.
Zauberman et al. (2006) find that, holding average intensity constant, improving trends
are preferred for hedonic evaluations, but declining trends are preferred for informational
evaluations. Together these moderators help us understand how overall evaluations vary
across real world experiences that differ on a number of dimensions.

C. Past research related to novelty’s effect on overall evaluations
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Although novelty has not been the focus of any one investigation in the snapshot model,
some authors have observed preliminary effects or discussed related constructs. Ariely
and Carmon (2000) and Ariely (1998) observed a muted effect of peak pain on overall
evaluations when the focal experience was one of many such encounters with the
stimulus domain. In their study, participants were long-term patients in a bone marrow
transplant unit. These patients were asked to report overall evaluations of the pain
experienced during a medical procedure. Long-term patients tended to provide
evaluations that were based more on previous experiences and less on their on-line
ratings of the focal experience. One interpretation of this result is that patients wellversed with this experience reported overall evaluations that were based on a generalized
understanding of this type of experience instead of an integration of the focal episode’s
affect (see Robinson and Clore 2002).

Kemp, Burt, and Furneaux (2008) investigated students’ evaluations of their vacations.
These authors found that affect experienced during aspects that were most “unusual”
relative to daily life had a high correlation with overall evaluations. However, this finding
has a few caveats. The authors did not report the incremental contribution of unusual
moments in predicting overall evaluations. Instead, they only reported a high correlation
between affect from unusual moments and overall evaluations of affect. In their study,
affect derived from different gestalt characteristics of the experience were highly
correlated and in some cases identified by the same moments. As such, the reported data
do not distinguish unusual aspects of the vacation from aspects of the vacation that were
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memorable in other ways. For instance, affect derived from unusual aspects may have
been near the same level as affect derived from the peak, and potentially an unusual
aspect could have actually been the peak. Further, because the purpose of a vacation is to
experience activities that are unlike daily life, unusual aspects may have been more
influential because they provided more meaning to these experiences and were more
diagnostic for evaluations (see Frederickson 2000).

Montgomery and Unnava (2009) tested the role of stimulus incongruity in two of their
studies. In one study involving a written description of a vacation, they found that peak
intensity or trough intensity only influenced overall evaluations when these aspects were
unexpected. Aspects were pre-tested for their perceived incongruity using a three-item
scale measuring how expected activities were relative to participants’ knowledge about
vacations (“poor example/ good example,” “unrepresentative/ representative,” “atypical/
typical”). The focal activities tested featured unexpected elements, such as encountering a
group of celebrities during an otherwise normal vacation activity. In another study
involving a sequence of music clips they found that a music clip’s associated affect had a
larger influence on overall evaluations if it was presented in an incongruous way relative
to other music clips. While other clips were presented without pauses, the focal,
incongruous clip was presented with pauses before and after its presentation. Neither of
Montgomery and Unnava’s (2009) incongruity studies clarifies whether the incongruous
elements led to enhanced encoding versus other explanations for greater weighting.
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D. Explanations for the snapshot model
Why are some aspects weighted more than others in overall evaluations? One explanation
is that gestalt characteristics could be more memorable and thus more likely to influence
evaluations. Ariely and Carmon (2000) explain peak effects as emerging from encoding
advantages. The strong positive relationship between affective intensity and memory
encoding has been observed in the literature on emotion in memory, helping to explain
the privileged status of the peak of affect (Gold 1987; Heuer and Reisberg 1990). The end
of an experience could be more accessible due to its recency, which is a retrieval
advantage (see Miller and Campbell 1959). Memorial differences could occur for two
reasons. First, some aspects of the experience may simply be forgotten. According to this
availability account, people may be unable to encode and retain all of the moments in an
experience, resulting in their weighting only those elements of the experience available in
memory. Second, according to an enhanced accessibility account, even if people are
capable of recalling several aspects of an experience profile, only some of these aspects
will be accessible at the time of judgment, resulting in their higher weighting in overall
evaluations (Ariely and Carmon 2000).

An alternative mechanism is that some aspects of the experience provide more meaning
in the global evaluation task than other moments. Frederickson (2000) states that
accessibility is not the only explanation for heavier weighting of peak and end intensity.
Peaks and ends also provide personal meaning. Specifically, peaks convey capacity
requirements–the maximum of affect one must brace for in anticipation of a re-
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experience of the episode, and endings convey certainty, providing the opportunity to
reflect on the experience once it is safely in the past. Ariely and Carmon (2000) explain
trend effects as emerging from extrapolation, in which the final trend helps to predict the
intensity of a future re-experience of the episode. Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) argue
that trend effects could be driven by savoring and dread, adaptation, and loss aversion.
Together these explanations offer different ways in which these gestalt characteristics
could be meaningful across a wide range of experiences. Meaning could also be
idiosyncratic to the episode, the person experiencing the episode, or the judgment
context. Frederickson (2000) proposed that further research should explore “evaluation
by meaning” as an addendum to evaluation-by-moments. Ariely, Kahneman, and
Loewenstein (2000) also mentioned personal meaning as a determinant of why gestalt
characteristics are important. Further, Ariely and Carmon (2001) and Kemp et al. (2008)
argue that people’s reasons for their overall evaluations may impact how they form these
evaluations.

These two sets of explanations can be synthesized with an accessibility-diagnosticity
perspective on evaluation-by-moments (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Such a frame would
suggest two determinants of how experiences are evaluated retrospectively: A configural
aspect or static moment of an experience is weighted in an overall evaluation to the
extent that it is accessible at the time of the evaluation, and it is deemed diagnostic in the
specific evaluation task. Particular aspects of the experience are more accessible or
diagnostic than others, explaining differential weighting of affective moments.
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E. Unresolved issues in the snapshot model paradigm
In this dissertation I examine how memorial factors influence overall evaluations, over
and above diagnosticity effects in these judgments. Nonetheless, exploring diagnosticity
as a mechanism could be a fruitful area for future inquiry. It is unclear how people judge
certain aspects to be meaningful to the experience. Do people base their diagnosticity
judgments on their own goals, do they have lay beliefs about which moments should be
more meaningful, or do they form such judgments at the time of the evaluation?
Accessibility and diagnosticity could also interact in overall evaluations. More accessible
aspects, such as the peak and end, may be treated as more diagnostic even when they do
not provide additional meaning beyond other moments. Such a relationship is consistent
with a mere-accessibility framework (Menon and Raghubir 2003). Another possibility is
that aspects of the experience that are deemed meaningful during the experience are
encoded better, resulting in their greater accessibility at the time of evaluation.

There are also unresolved issues related to the role of memory in the snapshot model. The
availability account (i.e., the argument that only some aspects of the experience are
available in memory, and these aspects constitute gestalt characteristics) has failed to
receive empirical support thus far. One test of the availability account would be to
manipulate the encoding of moments through selective attention tasks, as recommended
by Ariely and Carmon (2000). Presumably moments that are experienced with distraction
would be less influential in overall evaluations, because they would be unavailable in
memory. Such a test would be difficult to administer experimentally, since a distraction
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task would also change the participant’s subjective experience. Although this
methodology has not been pursued, Kemp et al. (2008) tested recall of affect to examine
if available moments were more influential in evaluations. Specifically, respondents were
asked to reconstruct the day-to-day affect they had experienced during an extended
vacation. Such recall of affect was generally poor, correlating less than 0.3 with on-line
measures of affect. Even affective intensity of gestalt characteristics, such as peak and
end, were reconstructed rather than retrieved, yet overall evaluations correlated highly
with recalled intensity of these gestalt characteristics. Together, these findings suggest
that even when gestalt characteristics are not more available in memory they are still
weighted more, contrary to an availability account.

Enhanced accessibility (i.e., enhanced ability to retrieve only some of the available
aspects of the experience) has been demonstrated as a mechanism driving overall
evaluations (see Montgomery and Unnava 2009). So far, standard psychological
measures of accessibility, such as explicit measures of memory or aided recall tests, have
not yet been administered in the snapshot model literature. For many types of continuous
experiences the accessibility of specific moments is difficult to measure and instead must
be inferred based on how different moments are weighted. For instance, people would be
unable to articulate the specific moments in a continuous sauna session that come to mind
at the time of a global evaluation. On the other hand, for experiences with discrete
elements, accessibility can be tested by differential retrieval cues, which would highlight
particular aspects of the experience at the time of evaluation. While these measures of
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accessibility can be pursued by future researchers, manipulations of accessibility have
already been pursued, lending evidence for the enhanced accessibility account. In
Montgomery and Unnava’s (2009) studies, moments of experiences that were
manipulated to be more accessible were more influential on overall evaluations.

A next step for the snapshot model literature is studying factors that influence how
experiences are accessed. Some of the factors studied previously include differences
across experiences in how they are configured or differences across forms of evaluations.
The literature can also be advanced by studying changes in how a given type of
experience is evaluated. In particular, little research has examined how experiences are
evaluated after a delay, when accessibility is likely to be diminished. While it is
informative to measure overall evaluations of experiences as soon as episodes have
concluded, such evaluations are not always formed in real world settings. An overall
evaluation may instead be formed later when it is useful for a decision. Indeed, past work
on affective evaluations of objects has found that different factors influence delayed
evaluations depending on if the evaluation had been formed immediately or only after a
delay (Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2008). Similar results
may occur in evaluations of extended experiences.

How might delay impact overall evaluations? Delay often implies that the later evaluation
is in a different setting than the focal experience, resulting in a different set of retrieval
cues. In the present investigation, I control for the setting in which an evaluation is
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formed and instead focus on passage of time itself. After a delay there is greater error in
recalling episodic details. Consequently, overall evaluations may be based on a theory of
the experience rather than episodic memory (see Robinson and Clore 2002). Apart from a
general increase in error, error may also be systematically different over time. For
instance, the end of the experience may not be as accessible after a delay, because the end
is not that much more recent than other moments. That recency effects diminish with
delay has been demonstrated by prior research on memory (e.g., Bjork and Whitten 1974,
Glenberg and Swanson 1986). Montgomery and Unnava (2009), the only empirical
investigation that compared immediate with delayed overall evaluations of extended
experiences, also found that the end effect held for immediate but not delayed
evaluations, consistent with memory research.

Accumulation of experience may be another factor that could change how a given type of
experience is evaluated. Compared to the totality of life experience, an episode or aspect
of an episode may be perceived as novel due to its unique stimulus or conceptual
characteristics. As the experience ceases to be novel, future episodes could be accessed
differently. Substantively, studying novelty helps marketers predict how accumulated
experience influences consumers’ evaluations. Because novelty has been shown to drive
various psychological outcomes, studying novelty would also extend our theoretical
understanding of how experiences are evaluated.
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III. Definition of novelty
Novelty is a rich construct in psychology with a long history. In this section I review
extant work on novelty and provide my definition of the construct.

A. Definition of novelty in Berlyne (1960)
The most cited source that discusses novelty is Berlyne (1960). For Berlyne, novelty is
one of a small set of “collative variables” which he defines as the following:
…in order to evaluate them it is necessary to examine the similarities and
differences, compatibilities and incompatibilities between elements—between a
present stimulus and stimuli that have been experienced previously (novelty and
change), between one element of a pattern and other elements that accompany it
(complexity), between simultaneously aroused responses (conflict), between
stimuli and expectations (surprisingness), or between simultaneously aroused
expectations (uncertainty). (p. 44)

Berlyne distinguishes “long-term” novelty from “short-term” novelty (p. 19). Long-term
novelty refers to the stimulus or experience being new relative to the totality of
experience for the organism. I describe experiences that lack in novelty as being
‘conventional.’ Short-term novelty refers to the element either being different from other
elements in the immediate context or different from expectations about that context. In
this dissertation I focus on long-term novelty, referring to short-term novelty as
‘incongruity.’ Later, I will compare and contrast these two constructs.
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Berlyne recognizes the difficulty in establishing a clear-cut definition of novelty.
Novelty is not a dichotomous construct, because any stimulus or experience will have
some connection to previously encountered objects or occurrences. For instance, a
vacation to an exotic island is still in some ways not novel to the tourist. The tourist may
have visited beaches near his hometown or sampled food from that island on another
occasion. More promising is Berlyne’s conceptualization of novelty as a continuous
variable, defined by three dimensions. Berlyne states:
…how novel a particular stimulus is will presumably be inversely related to: (1) how
often patterns that are similar enough to be relevant have been experienced before, (2)
how recently they have been experienced, and (3) how similar they have been. (p. 22)

Here similarity between the focal stimulus and prior stimuli depends on the degree of
stimulus generalization. For instance, a cover band’s rendition of a hit song from the
1980s may not be novel, because prior experiences with the very similar, copied song are
generalized towards the cover song. In contrast, a new composition from a band that
specializes in experimental music could be experienced as novel, because the listener is
unable to relate this experience to any other. Novel elements have an enhanced capacity
to function as conditioned stimuli, because responses are uncertain and no existing
responses are generalized to them (p. 69). According to Berlyne, novelty is a relative
phenomenon: A stimulus is novel relative to a specific class of stimuli. For example, a
film can be novel relative to other films in terms of its use of visual imagery, plot, or
other element, even though the idea of depicting a narrative in film is not in and of itself
novel relative to different genres of entertainment.
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Berlyne also describes the commonly shared effects of novel elements on subjective
experience. According to his habituation hypothesis argument, novel elements differ from
conventional elements in that the organism has become habituated to the latter, and as a
result the conventional elements have “lost their effects.” In a related vein, Berlyne
argues that novel elements induce conflict, whereas conventional elements do not:
A novel stimulus is likely to fall midway between two classes that have figured
in a piece of discrimination learning, so that it will arouse both generalized
excitation and generalized inhibition of the response, which again means conflict.
(p. 21)
Summarizing these ideas, Berlyne argues that organisms try to make sense of novel
elements, but they need not take on such efforts for conventional elements.

B. Other definitions of novelty
Cognitive psychologists have studied novelty in various tests of arousal, memory,
categorization, and other outcomes. Novelty is often not explicitly defined in their
writings, leaving readers to rely on accepted definitions of novelty in common language,
such as “Something new, not previously experienced, unusual, or unfamiliar” (“Novelty,”
Oxford English Dictionary, 2009). Yet, these authors’ operationalizations of novelty
provide an avenue by which to infer how they conceptualized novelty. Later, I will
describe how novelty has been tested in the Von Restorff paradigm (e.g., Von Restorff
1933, Hunt 1995) and in other work.
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The consumer behavior literature also describes the newness of products, conceptualized
on two levels: incrementally new products and really new products (Alexander, Lynch,
and Wang 2008; Hoeffler 2003; Moreau, Markman, and Lehmann 2001). This distinction
relates to the amount of prior knowledge applicable to the product innovation.
Incrementally new products allow the consumer to import existing knowledge structures
to understand the innovation, but really new products are more difficult for consumers to
understand, because these types of products are less related to existing product categories
(Moreau et al. 2001). Alexander et al. (2008) differentiate really new products (RNPs)
from incrementally new products (INP) along the following dimensions:
(1) RNPs enable consumers to do things that cannot be easily done with existing
ways to solve similar problems, and INPs do not;
(2) The benefits of consumption are more uncertain for RNPs than for INPs;
(3) Cost-benefit tradeoffs in utility functions are more uncertain for RNPs than for
INPs because of consumers’ lack of understanding of attribute-to-benefits links or
practice in making cost-benefit tradeoffs; and
(4) Consumers must make greater changes in their own behavior to attain the
potential benefits of RNPs than to attain the potential benefits of INPs. (p. 308)

Thus, the novelty of a product innovation is based on the level of knowledge for that
product and relevance of prior product experiences. These concepts have parallels with
Berlyne’s (1960) definition of novelty, in which a stimulus is novel to the extent that
other stimulus responses cannot be generalized to it.

C. Novelty as defined in the present investigation
Below I define the novelty of a consumption experience:
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How novel a consumption experience is will be inversely related to: (1) how often
consumption episodes that are similar enough to be relevant have been directly
experienced before, and (2) how similar the experience is to previously experienced
episodes.

Whereas Berlyne’s (1960) definition was drafted to encompass behavior for humans as
well as lower-level organisms, this definition focuses on consumer behavior more
specifically. As such, I modify Berlyne’s dimensions to emphasize the consumption
experience context. According to the first dimension, as more similar experiences have
been accumulated, the experience ceases to be novel to the consumer. I do not include or
modify Berlyne’s second component on recency (i.e., how recently similar experiences
have taken place), because that component was relevant for incongruity but less relevant
for long-term novelty. For instance, if a consumer were to go on two vacations to Hawaii
separated by five years, the second vacation may still be perceived as less novel despite
the large temporal gap in experiences. The second dimension described here is based off
of Berlyne’s third dimension. If one can easily understand a target experience with
knowledge of other experiences, then the target episode will provide little new
experiential information. Importantly, novelty stems from stimulus or conceptual
differences, and not from differences in affective intensity alone.

Both dimensions described above depend on direct experiences rather than exposure to
information collected from external sources. One might ask: Can people understand new
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subjective experiences with objective knowledge alone? This question has been tackled
by phenomenological philosophers (e.g., Husserl 1931), and resolving this issue may help
delineate humanity’s potential for understanding. While philosophers of science address
this concern, I have much humbler goals in this dissertation, focusing only on evaluations
of experiences. Whether knowing about a new experience is akin to actually experiencing
the episode is questionable, but these different forms of knowledge have been shown to
feel different to consumers. Indeed, consumers believe that direct experience is
nonpartisan, and it is more vivid, intentional, and memorable than knowledge acquired
from external sources (Hoch 2002). Nelson (1970) argues that consumer purchases can
be differentiated as either search or experience goods. For search goods, information for
the most important attributes can be acquired prior to purchase, but for experience goods
most attribute information must be directly experienced to facilitate understanding. The
present investigation focuses on consumption episodes that can be described as
experience goods.

The novelty definition articulated above adapts existing definitions in the consumer
behavior literature. According to Alba and Hutchinson (1987), product familiarity arises
from “advertising exposures, information search, interactions with salespersons, choice
and decision making, purchasing, and product usage in various situations.” Moreau et
al.’s (2001) research on incrementally new versus really new products defines familiarity
as arising from category knowledge. Thus, in these past investigations concerning
products, semantic knowledge can make a previously unused product familiar, and
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novelty is confounded with unfamiliarity. In contrast, in the present investigation only the
accumulation of direct experiences influences the novelty of that type or similar types of
experiences. Indirect familiarity with a new experience, such as through exposure to
advertising, is not predicted to have the same effects as direct experience.

In the definition of novelty put forth in the present investigation, novelty depends on the
individual: A given experience can be novel to one individual but conventional to
another. However, in the studies reported here, novelty is not treated as an individual
difference variable, because such an operationalization may not sufficiently discriminate
novelty from other constructs, such as expertise. Research on consumer expertise
indicates that more accumulated experiences is associated with increased expertise,
which can make it difficult to test the unique effect of accumulated experiences since it is
often confounded with expertise when the two are measured rather than manipulated
(Alba and Hutchinson 1987).

One way in which novelty is operationalized in this dissertation is by selecting
experiences that are prevalent or infrequent across all participants’ natural distributions of
life experiences. In an alternative test of novelty I also manipulate exposure to
experiences. Specifically, an experience that is new for all participants is presented as a
focal episode in a study, and this episode is either preceded or followed by experiences
like it. Prior exposure results in the focal episode being perceived as less unique both
during its course and at the time of an overall evaluation. Conversely, subsequent
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exposure results in the focal episode being perceived as less unique only at the time of a
later overall evaluation. These exposure manipulations isolate a dimension of novelty, the
number of direct experiences in the domain, and alter the focal experiences from being
unique to more common.

IV. Novelty effects on memory
The intuition that novelty influences memory has existed for millennia. This relationship
was first encountered in the written record of Western Civilization in the first century
B.C. in a series of scrolls known as the Ad Herennium in a section on ‘Memoria’ (Wollen
and Margres 1987). There is considerable evidence for novelty impacting memory
through different mechanisms, including distinctive processing, involvement, rehearsal,
and learning. I describe these mechanisms below and explain how they relate to the
present investigation.

A. Novelty’s effect on distinctive processing: the Von Restorff effect
Since the advent of experimental psychology, distinctive processing of novel elements
has been demonstrated in a variety of settings and with empirical regularity. The most
prominent of these findings is the Von Restorff effect, also known as the isolation effect.
The eponymous author who discovered this result, Hedwig von Restorff, tested the effect
of isolating an item in a list on memory for that item (Hunt 1995; Von Restorff 1933).
She found that after a delay of one day memory for isolated items was superior to
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memory for decoy items. For instance, in remembering the content of a list that contained
one digit and nine words, participants were better able to remember the value of the one
digit than any of the nine words. Though word lists are the most common stimuli
employed in research on the isolation effect, other domains tested include faces (Brandt
et al. 2003), narratives (Davidson 2006), and line drawings (Ellis, Detterman, Runcie,
McCarver and Craig, 1971). The memorial advantage of distinctive elements is evident in
recognition, free-recall, and cued recall tasks (Worthen 2006).

Since von Restorff’s (1933) classic article, distinctiveness has been the subject of a great
deal of research activity (for a thorough review, see Hunt and Worthen 2006). A few
developments have been particularly important. First, greater memory for distinctive
elements has been demonstrated both for incongruous (i.e., short-term novel) and longterm novel elements. Schmidt (1991) provides a similar dichotomy, referring to
incongruity as “primary distinctiveness” and long-term novelty as “secondary
distinctiveness.” Incongruity effects have been demonstrated by isolating features of
words from other words in a list, such as through contrasting physical features
(Kishiyama and Yonelinas 2003) or membership in an incongruous semantic category
(Geraci and Rajaram 2004). Long-term novelty effects have been demonstrated by testing
words or combination of letters that are uncommon in the totality of the participant’s life
experience (e.g., Rajaram 1998).
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Second, distinctiveness has been shown not to be a property of the isolated element, but
instead a psychological process that depends on the relationship between the isolated
element and the other elements. An object that is distinctive in an incongruous context,
such as a soda can stocked alongside hand soaps, will not be distinctive in a congruous
context, such as when the soda can is included with other soft drink cans. Similarly, an
element that is novel in the long-term sense will not be distinctive if it is included in a set
of other novel elements (Hunt 2006). For an element to be distinctively processed, it must
be different in the context of similarity. That is, the element must be different from all
other elements, and the other elements must be similar to each other. This implies that
long-term novel elements are only distinctively processed if they are included in a set of
conventional elements (Hunt and Elliot 1980).

Third, past work has demonstrated that the isolation effect occurs due, in part, to
enhanced retrieval of distinctively processed elements. Novel elements may be retrieved
better because their features provide diagnostic information that benefits memory
performance (Hunt and McDaniel 1993). In particular, isolated elements exhibit
enhanced discriminability from other elements. As well, distinct elements are easier to
retrieve because they are part of a smaller category set (Bruce and Gaines 1976). In sum,
the retrieval explanation suggests that novel aspects of experiences will be more
accessible due to less interference in memory.
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Fourth, elaborate encoding has been shown to be an additional but not necessary account
for the isolation effect. The encoding explanation is supported by involvement
mechanisms described below, such as differences in the orienting response, arousal, and
processing. However, the isolation effect occurs for incongruous elements even when the
isolated element is the first one encountered, when it is not evident that this element will
be distinctive within the set (Hunt 2006). This result suggests that elaborate encoding
alone cannot explain the isolation effect. Still, encoding is often affected when novelty is
manipulated.

B. Novelty’s effect on involvement in the experience
Below, I describe three mechanisms by which novelty has the potential to alter
involvement in an experience, which in turn may influence how the experience is
encoded.

1. Mechanism 1: Novelty’s effect on the orienting response
Organisms are bombarded with an immense set of stimuli and experiences that grab at
their attention in any natural environment. What will they process? A large stream of
literature supports the finding that novel elements are more perceptually salient, resulting
in an orienting response, “a change in posture, in the orientation of sense organs, or in the
state of sense organs” (Berlyne 1960 p. 79). An orienting preference for novelty has been
tested extensively with infants, demonstrating that infants gaze at novel patterns more

29
than conventional patterns (Fantz 1964). Adult humans have also shown this effect
(Berlyne 1971; Berlyne and Ditkofsky 1976) across the auditory (Friedman, Cycowicz,
and Gaeta 2001), visual (Polich and Comerchero 2003), and somatosensory (Yamaguchi
and Knight 1991) modalities. Orientation towards novel elements occurs both for
incongruous (short-term novel) elements as well as elements that are novel in the longterm sense (Cycowicz and Friedman 2007). Studies of the brain demonstrate that there is
a particular region associated with this orienting response. These brain studies also show
that such orientation can occur incidentally and non-consciously (Cycowicz and
Friedman 1997, 1998, 1999). Further work on rats and other animals demonstrated that
this result extends across many mammalian species (e.g., Dias and Honey 2002).

The orienting response to novelty has been tied to adaptive mechanisms. For instance,
Shinskey and Munakata (2005) discuss infants’ orientation to novel patterns:
“Novelty preferences reflect the efficiency of immature organisms' information
processing: Once infants have mastered all the information one stimulus offers,
attending to a new stimulus is an adaptive strategy for acquiring large amounts of
information in a short time.”

The orienting response research emphasizes perceptual involvement as a mechanism to
explain differential encoding for novel versus conventional elements (Cycowicz and
Friedman 1998). Novel elements are more likely to be directly perceived and encoded
than conventional elements, and as a result their affective value may be more available at
the time of a memory test. Such an explanation has particular relevance for busy stimuli
fields in which several inputs need to be encoded, and only some can receive attention.
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For instance, it is possible that consumers in some contexts will attend to novel aspects of
experiences but not conventional aspects, which they will not even perceive. However, in
the studies reported here all participants are explicitly instructed to attend to the
experience regardless of its novelty. Because people attend to events that are relevant to
their goals, this type of instruction can equalize orientation towards conventional and
novel experiences (see Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, and Gilbert 2005).

2. Mechanism 2: Novelty’s effects on arousal
Berlyne (1960 p. 48) describes arousal as “how wide awake the organism is,” and he
argues that novelty can enhance arousal. Arousal has a complex history in psychology.
There are a number of investigators who support arousal as an explanatory variable (e.g.,
Anderson 1990) and others who have abandoned it altogether (e.g., Neiss 1990). Those
who have researched arousal have distinguished the orienting response from it. The
orienting response has a direct effect on whether the element is perceived in the first
place, whereas arousal refers to the subjective experience for the organism, conditional
on perception. Arousal is intertwined with attention, directing information processing
(Lynn 1966).

When people have been exposed to an experience on multiple occasions, they become
habituated to it. According to some prior research, experiences can be less intense—and
by extension less arousing—as a result of accumulated experience (Bindra 1959; Frijda
1988; Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Sharpless and Jasper 1956; Stein 1966).
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Berlyne (1960) argues that more arousing stimuli are also more salient, because they are
perceived distinctively compared to surrounding stimuli. Thus, higher arousal may
mediate novelty’s effect on involvement. If novel experiences are more arousing, they
may be encoded better and be more accessible at the time of later memory tests.

This line of reasoning, linking novelty to greater memorability through higher arousal,
has two limitations. First, because arousal depends on intensity, this argument assumes
that novel experiences are more intense—an assumption that is not warranted in many
comparisons (Berlyne 1960). Novel experiences of one type may not be as intense as
conventional experiences of another type. For instance, eating Norwegian cuisine may be
perceived as novel for Mexicans, but Mexicans may find that eating their own,
conventional cuisine is more intense (perhaps because Mexican food is spicier). As such,
any comparison between novel and conventional experiences must control for intensity
differences. It is also unclear whether a given experience will be subjectively more or less
intense as it becomes less novel over time through accumulated experience. Habituation
(Stein 1966) or sense-making (Wilson and Gilbert 2003; Wilson, Gilbert, and Centerbar
2002) could reduce intensity. On the other hand, a conventional experience could feel
more intense due to the organism having learned a response to it (Berlyne 1960), or
because greater fluency is experienced with more exposure (Zajonc 1968). For instance,
the first time a consumer drinks a wine with a subtle flavor he is likely to experience a
mild reaction to it. Over time, he may learn to appreciate the wine better, and the wine
tasting experience may be more intense on subsequent occasions. In fact, some of
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consumers’ very enjoyable and exciting consumption episodes may be those that they
experience regularly.

Second, arousal has an inconsistent effect on memory for the arousing experience. If
salience occurs due to enhanced arousal, the effect on memory cannot be anticipated.
Park (2005) reviewed the literature linking arousal and retention in memory. This
research demonstrates that for short-term retention intervals low arousal aids in memory,
but for long-term retention high levels of arousal are beneficial. Additionally, arousal
does not have a monotonic relationship with memory for information. Earlier writers
(Berlyne 1950; McDougall 1908) mention that moderate levels of arousal are superior in
evoking long-term memory effects compared to maximum levels of arousal. This result
possibly stems from people having an optimal level of arousal. The inverted-U
relationship known as the Yerkes-Dodson law states that performance is often best at
moderate levels of arousal (Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Moderate arousal often leads to
optimal vigilance, which has downstream implications for liking, remembering, and a
host of other outcomes. Berlyne (1971) discusses two different conflicting processes that
result in the inverted-U relationship: A primary reward system generates positive affect
whenever arousal potential increases, but a primary aversion system generates negative
affect whenever arousal increases past an optimal tipping point (see also Silvia 2005).
These competing forces result in an experience being processed optimally at moderate
levels of arousal.
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Together, these disparate findings on arousal paint a complicated picture of novelty’s
effect on encoding. As such, I do not champion arousal as a mechanism driving the
results reported in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is important to control for arousal
differences in the present investigation. For instance, novel and conventional experiences
can be matched on intensity levels by measuring affective intensity. Alternatively, a
given experience can be rendered less novel through subsequent exposure to similar
experiences. In this case, the focal episode will be similarly arousing to all participants,
regardless of the subsequent episodes they experience.

3. Mechanism 3: The Novelty-Encoding Hypothesis
The novelty-encoding hypothesis also predicts greater salience of novel stimuli. Tulving,
Habib, and colleagues (Habib 2001; Habib et al.2003; Habib and LePage 2000; Tulving
and Kroll 1995) identified neurophysiological substrates for novelty assessment.
According to their model, the brain has a specialized system for identifying novel stimuli.
The medial temporal lobes assess the degree of novelty for each stimulus by comparing
the stimulus to information in memory. Based on the relative novelty of stimuli, the
prefrontal monitoring mechanism differentially weights stimuli to be encoded into
memory, with novel stimuli receiving higher weights (Tulving and Kroll 1995).

The explanation for novelty-encoding is that stimuli deemed distinctive or novel require
elaborate processing resources (Brandt, Gardiner, and Macrae 2006). Thus, the novelty
encoding hypothesis relies on processing involvement as the mechanism for superior
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recollection of novel stimuli. This explanation is also consistent with Berlyne’s (1960)
notion that novel stimuli generate conflict. However, because the novelty-encoding
hypothesis has largely been tested on word lists and simple perceptual stimuli, it may not
apply as well to stimuli that are intentionally experienced and recalled, as often occurs in
consumer behavior. Consumers have more volition in the types of consumption
experiences they undergo, and they may allocate processing resources depending on their
preferences or goals rather than the novelty of the experience itself.

C. Novelty’s effect on post-experience rehearsal
After an experience has concluded, thoughts about the episode may continue, and novelty
may impact such rehearsal of the experience. Wilson, Gilbert, and Centerbar (2002)
argue that after a novel event occurs, “people automatically engage in cognitive work that
makes the event seem predictable and explainable.” They refer to this sense-making
process as “ordinization.” Ordinization implies that experiences encountered regularly are
less likely to spur further reflection. Berlyne (1960) also argues that novel stimuli are
associated with conflict and uncertainty, which tend to activate thoughts to resolve them.
As such, novel experiences lead to more rehearsal than conventional experiences. This
greater rehearsal could in turn enhance the memorability of novel experiences.

Ordinization suggests a stronger effect of novelty on memory than does the Von Restorff
effect. Whereas the Von Restorff effect predicts that novel experiences will be more
accessible given a retrieval cue (e.g., an overall evaluation probe), ordinization predicts
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that novel experiences will also be more chronically accessible, even without a direct
memory probe. Wilson et al. (2002) report a study in which they manipulated how
explainable an experienced romantic interaction was. Later, they measured the
accessibility of romance-related thoughts with an ostensibly unrelated word completion
task. Participants for whom the romantic interaction was not ordinized (i.e., if the
interaction was not explainable) were more likely to complete these words with romancerelated concepts. This finding suggests that a novel experience will engender thoughts
about the experience that may last well past the end of the experience. The experience
may still be top of mind at the time of a delayed overall evaluation.

Whether longer rehearsal of novel experiences will actually influence overall evaluations
depends on the length of delay studied, the intensity of the experience, participants’
goals, and other factors that contribute to whether the experience continues to be
rehearsed. The types of experiences studied in the present investigation may not be
personally significant enough to stimulate rehearsal over any extended period. As such, I
do not focus on rehearsal effects in the empirical investigation. Nonetheless, differences
in rehearsal are important to control for, because novelty may lead to more spontaneous
immediate construction of overall evaluations through more elaborate rehearsal. This
possibility will be discussed later.
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D. Novelty’s effect on learning
Whereas each of the memory mechanisms described above suggests that novelty
enhances memory, research on learning finds that lack of prior experience, a dimension
of novelty, diminishes memory. These seemingly conflicting predictions can be
reconciled upon closer inspection into the memory processes involved. Because novelty
often leads to greater involvement, novelty will enhance memorability if the experience
would not be sufficiently involving otherwise. Because novelty contributes to distinctive
processing, novelty will enhance memorability if the memory task depends critically on
accessing an experience in the face of possible interference with other experiences.
However, because learning is superior with prior experience in a domain, novelty will
diminish memorability if the memory task depends on accessing detailed attribute
information.

Why might consumers be better able to remember attribute information for common
experiences? Through repeated experiences, consumers are exposed to similar attribute
information on each occasion. In order to make sense of this information, consumers
develop a cognitive structure for the type of experience as well as domain-specific
analytical and elaborative skills. Together, repetition, a cognitive structure, and domainspecific skills tend to enhance memory for attribute information, as revealed by
differences in novice and expert consumers’ memory (Alba and Hutchinson 1987).
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Research on consumer learning observes many instances in which prior knowledge or
familiarity aids in memory for attribute information. Lynch and Srull (1982) provide a
review of earlier consumer research with this finding. Johnson and Russo (1984) also find
that familiarity facilitates learning, conditional on sufficient involvement; consumers who
are highly familiar with a product class may search less, exposing themselves to less new
information. Kent and Allen (1994) revealed that memory for advertising was superior
for familiar than unfamiliar brands. Shapiro and Spence (2002) found that simply
providing consumers with evaluative criteria prior to a product trial aids in their memory
for attributes. Given that consumers develop such criteria as they repeat a type of
experience, novel experiences will be associated with poorer recall for their attributes.

Consumption experiences may be evaluated on either encountered attributes, experienced
affect, or both depending on the choice context. Evaluations of attributes and affect may
jointly determine many choices, but there may also be conditions in which only one type
of evaluation governs choice. For example, a restaurant experience may be scored on
various attributes: variety and quality of menu items, ambience, location, cost, etc. These
judgments could feed into choices in which various attributes are weighted in a restricted
context, such as when a consumer needs to visit a restaurant with a quiet ambience and
higher perceived luxury to conduct a business dinner. Alternatively, consumers may
evaluate experiences purely on their own affective response. For instance, a consumer
may decide to go to the restaurant she had the best experience at, independent of its
attributes.
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Attribute and affective information vary on at least two dimensions. First, attribute
information is externally presented, whereas experienced affect is internal to the
consumer. Internal states are more prominent in consumers’ subjective experience
(Loewenstein 1996), which may make them more likely to influence choices. Second,
attribute information is detailed and requires deliberation, but experienced affect is a
more “global response” (Zajonc 1980 p. 5). Indeed, recent research finds that experiences
with prior exposure are processed at a lower level of construal than novel experiences
(Förster 2008). This construal level finding is consistent with research on consumer
learning, which finds that prior experience aids in processing of detailed (i.e., lower level
construal) product information. In sum, differences in the type of information may lead to
asymmetric learning effects: Learning advantages are critical in memory for attribute
information but less important in memory for affective response, which is relatively easy
to evaluate retrospectively if the experience is accessible.

There are also boundary conditions to the attribute versus affect distinction in learning.
Some past research on memory for emotions finds that prior experience in a behavioral
domain can strengthen learning of experienced affect. Familiarity contributes to the
development of an enduring affective representation of the experience, which aids in
organizing experienced affect into memory (Breckler 1994; Breckler and Wiggins 1989,
1993). When an enduring affective representation is set, people are able to reconstruct
their affective response based on their memory for attributes, because affect is implied by
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these attributes. For instance, if one has had much prior experience eating sushi as well as
stable preferences in this domain, then it would be possible to form an overall evaluation
of enjoyment of a past sushi sequence by simply recalling the items consumed.

How might learning of affect influence overall evaluations of conventional and novel
experiences? The relationship between prior experience in a domain and accessibility of
affect may not be monotonic and may differ by experiential domain. While people can
easily access affect derived from a unique experience, as they accumulate more
experiences in the domain any one of these experiences becomes more difficult to access
due to interference. On the other hand, as people become well-versed with a domain they
set enduring affective representations which aids in learning of affect. However, only
when experiences are complex in their affective reactions would affective learning
advantages off-set memory interference disadvantages that arise from accumulated
experience. As such, affect from novel experiences should be easier to access than affect
from conventional experiences, assuming that experienced affect generally does not
require much deliberation.

V.

Novelty and related constructs

To further explicate novelty, I compare and contrast this construct with related constructs,
incongruity and unfamiliarity.

40
A. Novelty and incongruity
Experiences that are novel in the long-term sense may also be incongruous (i.e., novel in
the short-term sense), either by not fitting the immediately established context or by
failing to conform to expectations. For instance, after watching a series of cars whiz by
on the highway, seeing a hovercraft flying along the median will be surprising, because
such a scene contradicts prior expectations and the immediate context. As well, seeing
the hovercraft may be novel for those who have never seen such an unusual
transportation device. However, novelty and incongruity do not always go hand in hand.
There are many contexts in which a consumer expects novel experiences, such as when
visiting an area with a starkly different culture. In this context, a conventional experience
may in fact be incongruous. Novelty can be differentiated from incongruity
experimentally by providing a sequence of experiences without specified expectations. In
such cases, experiencing something novel would not be surprising.

Novelty and incongruity not only arise out of different conditions, but also they lead to a
different portfolio of effects on memory. One shared effect is that both novel and
incongruous aspects will be isolated in an experience with otherwise familiar or expected
elements. As a result, both novel and incongruous aspects are more accessible than other
aspects of experiences (Von Restorff 1933). Encoding effects that arise out of distinctive
processing apply to both novel and incongruous aspects. However, novel and
incongruous aspects have different effects on retrieval, which can be revealed by
comparing recall immediately after an experience versus after a delay. Mechanisms that
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enhance delayed accessibility for novel aspects, greater rehearsal and enhanced ability to
discriminate from a wide range of past experiences, do not apply to incongruous aspects.
In fact, incongruous aspects are often less accessible after a delay, because consumers
rely on theory-driven memory when recalling experiences from the past (Nunes and
Novemsky 2008). For instance, when recalling the enjoyment of a meal at a restaurant,
one might fail to access an element that did not fit expectations, because these
expectations determine how the experience is remembered. Moreover, whereas the
amount of accumulated experience—a dimension of novelty—influences learning,
incongruity has no predicted effect on learning.

B. Novelty and unfamiliarity
Novelty and unfamiliarity share some commonalities, but they are differentiated in this
dissertation. The number of relevant episodes previously experienced inversely relates to
both novelty and unfamiliarity. However, the amount of information collected from
external sources, such as through exposure to advertising, inversely relates to
unfamiliarity, but it is not a significant factor in novelty. Finally, the similarity of past
experiences to the target experience inversely relates to novelty, but it is not a contributor
to unfamiliarity.

A consumption experience example will help to illustrate these distinctions. Consider a
consumer planning her first ever wakeboarding excursion. Regardless of how much she
reads about wakeboarding in magazines or observes wakeboarders on television, her first
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wakeboarding trip could still be novel to her. When she recounts her wakeboarding
experience her memory will be relatively untainted by interference with other episodes.
Her exposure to wakeboarding information through external sources is unlikely to
interfere with her memory for experienced affect, though such knowledge may contribute
to her ability to recall information encountered during the wakeboarding trip. Now
imagine if this first-time wakeboarder has engaged in experiences that are similar to
wakeboarding, such as surfing, jet-skiing, and body boarding. These accumulated, highly
similar experiences may diminish the novelty of wakeboarding, influencing remembered
affect. These dimensions of novelty and unfamiliarity are illustrated in the Venn diagram,
figure 1 below, for the wakeboarding example.

As described above, there are some factors in novelty and unfamiliarity which do not
overlap. This conceptualization raises the question: Do the non-shared factors ever spill
over? First, can knowledge gained through external sources, a factor in unfamiliarity,
influence memory for affect? Robinson and Clore (2002) argue that people often develop
a lay theory about an affective experience through knowledge gleamed from external
sources. These lay theories can color memory for experienced emotions. Thus, even if a
domain is experienced for the first time one’s recall for affect may be more accurate if the
experience is associated with no prior knowledge.
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FIGURE 1
Figure 1: Comparison of unfamiliarity and novelty for the wakeboarding example

Although becoming familiar with an experience through external information can
influence memory for affect for new experiences, this effect is restricted to increases in
familiarity at the very lowest levels of the familiarity spectrum. One might develop an
attitude with just a little exposure to the experience concept (see Hermans, de Houwer,
and Eelen 1994 on automatic evaluation), and each additional exposure to such
information will not result in greater interference in recalling affect. The attitude could
become stronger or more nuanced through subsequent acquired knowledge, but the
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accessibility of the attitude is unlikely to change. Research on attitude activation finds
that even the weakest and least developed attitudes are activated automatically (Bargh et
al.1992), suggesting a ceiling effect on how accessible an attitude can become through
additional knowledge. Whereas accumulation of knowledge does not increase memory
interference for new experiences, accumulation of direct experience does, either by
reducing the number of features that provide diagnostic information (Hunt and McDaniel
1993), or by increasing the category set, which makes the retrieval task more difficult
(Bruce and Gaines 1976). Importantly, direct experiences are treated and likely
categorized differently from exposure to information (see Hoch 2002), particularly for
new experience goods (see Nelson 1970).

The second potential source of spillover is if a dimension attributed only to novelty can
actually determine unfamiliarity as well. Specifically, can having accumulated
experiences of a similar type make the focal experience familiar, leading to consumption
knowledge, expertise, and improved task performance? Because defining the
unfamiliarity-familiarity dimension is not the goal of this dissertation, I defer to the
existing marketing literature in answering this question. In the Venn diagram depicted
above, I take previous conceptualization of unfamiliarity as a given. The past research
largely studied familiarity with products, where familiarity with the specific brand,
product, or product category was the focal interest (e.g., Alba and Hutchinson 1987;
Bettman and Park 1980; Park and Lessig 1981). As such, experience in other, similar
product categories was not identified as a source of familiarity. Nonetheless, these
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authors also documented the potential for complexity in defining the relevant product
category, due to different categorization processes at play, including simple classification
and concept formation (see Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Variation in how experiences are
categorized implies that the degree of similarity to other experiences can determine
familiarity, which in turn influences the development of expertise. Indeed, other work
finds that knowledge from one class of product experiences can be transferred to another,
similar class (Gregan-Paxton and John 1997). Although these possibilities are intriguing,
I do not take charge of defining unfamiliarity and consequently do not explore this
extension in the present investigation.

A final point on nomenclature will help to unify this dissertation with psychological
research on novelty. In the psychological literature, novelty and familiarity are drawn as
endpoints of a continuum, implying that novelty and unfamiliarity are the same
constructs (e.g., in research on the Von Restorff effect). This word choice was in part a
result of the stimuli employed. Because most of the research on the Von Restorff effect
involved recall for words, direct versus indirect experience was not a relevant distinction
in describing accumulated experiences. However, that distinction is potentially important
in recall for affective experiences, as elaborated upon earlier.

VI. Hypotheses
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Building off of the literature review, I predict how novelty will influence overall
evaluations of extended experiences.

A. Basic effect of novelty
As described previously, encoding and retrieval mechanisms in the isolation effect result
in enhanced accessibility for novel elements. Yet, novelty’s effect has not been tested in
overall evaluations of extended experiences. Drawing from the isolation effect research,
one straightforward prediction is that novel aspects of experiences are more likely to be
accessed and thus more likely to influence overall evaluations of experienced affect. This
effect would be evident in experiences that include a mix of conventional and novel
aspects, in which distinctive processing occurs. If all of the elements of an experience are
novel, then no one aspect is relatively more accessible due to its novelty.

This prediction does not yet specify whether novel aspects of experiences are more
accessible due to more elaborate encoding or enhanced retrieval. This basic result would
also not reveal how novelty differs in its effect compared to other contributors to
enhanced accessibility, such as affective intensity. However, I argue that novelty and
intensity are separable factors, which suggests that even aspects of experiences that are
mild in their intensity but which are merely novel will be weighted in overall evaluations.
As well, novel aspects may influence overall evaluations when they are not at the end,
whereas conventional aspects are less likely to impact overall evaluations when they are
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not the peak or end. Thus, my first hypothesis concerning the basic effect of novelty on
overall evaluations is as follows:

H1: When aspects within an experience differ in their novelty, novel aspects are
more likely to influence overall evaluations than conventional aspects, even when
these aspects are not the peak or end of the experience.

B. Novelty’s effect on delayed overall evaluations
There are several instances in which conventional and novel aspects of experiences
similarly influence overall evaluations. Importantly, these similarities occur only for
immediate overall evaluations—those evaluations measured immediately after the
experience has concluded. For instance, regardless of their novelty, the peak and end
elements of an extended experience will be heavily weighted in such overall evaluations.
Moreover, whether an entire experience is conventional or novel, immediate overall
evaluations will be based on similar weighting rules, such as higher weighting of peak
intensity, end intensity, and trend.

On the other hand, novelty can lead to further differences for delayed overall evaluations,
which are driven by changes in memory interference as time elapses. Right after an
episode has concluded interference occurs only between aspects of this focal episode,
resulting in greater weighting of elements that are more accessible, such as peak and end
intensity. Immediately after an episode there is little potential for interference between
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the focal episode and other episodes. For instance, having just eaten a meal at a
restaurant, a consumer would be capable of uniquely accessing the episode even if he has
visited the restaurant previously. However, when the experience is accessed after a delay,
not only may interference between aspects of the focal episode occur, but also other
accumulated experiences interfere.

Because the pool of potential sources of interference expands over time to include similar
experiences, conventional experiences or aspects of experiences are likely to exhibit
diminished accessibility after a delay. As these conventional experiences become harder
to retrieve, delayed overall evaluations will display more error. In contrast, as a
byproduct of uniqueness, novel experiences or aspects of experiences will continue to be
accessible over time. As such, aspects of experiences that influence immediate overall
evaluations will be more enduring in their influence if these aspects are novel versus if
these aspects are conventional. Additionally, overall evaluations are likely to be more
accurate, reflecting experienced affect, if an experience is unique versus if the experience
is common. These predictions are formally stated below:

H2a: Aspects of extended experiences that influence immediate overall
evaluations—peak intensity and end intensity—will continue to influence delayed
overall evaluations if these aspects are novel. If these aspects are conventional,
they will diminish in their influence for delayed overall evaluations.
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H2b: Delayed overall evaluations will be more accurate, reflecting on-line affect,
if the experience is unique versus if the experience is common.

This set of predictions helps to distinguish novelty from related constructs, including
affective intensity and incongruity. Neither intensity nor incongruity is expected to
contribute to enhanced accessibility for delayed overall evaluations. Moreover, this set of
predictions clarifies the mechanism involved, implicating retrieval differences and
interference as contributing to novelty effects. In memory research finding a difference
between immediate and delayed memory tasks identifies that retrieval and not encoding
is responsible for the memory phenomenon.

C. Novelty’s effect on informational versus hedonic evaluations
Novelty is also expected to have different effects on evaluations depending on whether
experienced affect or attribute quality levels are evaluated retrospectively. Prior
experience—a factor that inversely relates to novelty—leads to enhanced learning. As a
result, detailed attribute information becomes more accessible for common than unique
experiences: Retrospective judgments of attribute quality levels will reflect more error for
unique compared to common experiences. However, such learning effects have little
impact on how affective experience is accessed. Hypotheses 2A and 2B stated above
predict that novelty will enhance accessibility for affective evaluations. Conversely,
hypothesis 3 predicts that novelty will diminish memory for attribute quality levels:
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H3: Recall for attribute quality levels will be more accurate if the experience is
common versus if the experience is unique.

D. Novelty’s effect on accessing indirect versus direct prior experiences
The definition of novelty put forth in this dissertation centers on the amount of direct
experience in the domain. This conceptualization implies that when people access novel
experiences, past indirect experiences—such as verbal descriptions of experiences—will
not interfere with overall evaluations of experienced affect. In contrast, for conventional
experiences indirect past experiences may also interfere with overall evaluations, because
enduring affective representations have already been set. For these conventional
experiences, verbal descriptions can function as episodes. The following prediction
distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity:
H4: Past indirect experiences in a domain will interfere in recall of affect for
conventional but not novel experiences. Overall evaluations of novel experiences
will be less reflective of on-line affect only with the accumulation of direct
experiences in the domain.

VII. Overview of studies
I test these hypotheses in five studies involving hedonic experiences. In all studies, I
disentangle affective intensity from novelty. This approach separates novelty’s effect on
on-line affect from its effect on overall evaluations. I employ three methods to control for
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affective intensity: measuring intensity during a repeat of an experience, manipulating
intensity, and measuring intensity during an experience. Study 1 investigates hypothesis
1: Using an annoying sound sequence as the focal experience, I test whether the
beginning of an experience will be more influential on overall evaluations if this aspect is
novel. This study involves both mild and intense novel sounds, because I argue that
overall evaluations will be pulled in the direction of novel aspects regardless of their
intensity. Study 2— also an annoying sounds study—tests hypothesis 2a, examining
whether the end of an experience will have a more enduring influence on overall
evaluations if the end is novel. Study 3 tests hypothesis 2b using pleasant images as the
experienced stimulus. Study 3 reveals whether delayed evaluations are more accurate,
reflecting on-line affect, if the episode is unique. Study 4 is designed to capture
differences between overall evaluations of affect and judgments of attribute quality
levels, testing hypothesis 3 by employing a browsing sequence as the focal experience.
Finally, Study 5 resolves hypothesis 4, investigating the role of novelty in accessing
indirect versus direct experiences in a domain.

VIII. Study 1: Manipulating the beginning of annoying
sounds
Study 1 is exploratory, testing the basic effect of novelty on overall evaluations, as
described by hypothesis 1. Prior theory predicts that the beginning intensity of an
experience is less likely to influence overall evaluations relative to the peak and end
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intensity. In contrast, I predict that the intensity of a novel beginning will influence
overall evaluations, but the intensity of a conventional beginning will not. In this study,
on-line experience was manipulated by including a conventional or novel sound to begin
a sequence of annoying sounds. Previous snapshot model research has also studied
annoying sounds for a number of reasons (e.g., Ariely and Zauberman 2000; Schreiber
and Kahneman 2000). Auditory stimuli can be edited through sound software, and the
relationship between auditory features, such as pitch, volume, or distortion and affective
response is established in sensory research. As well, sounds offer the possibility of
continuously measuring on-line affect. When listened to intently, annoying sounds can
provide negative affect at every moment of exposure to the stimulus.

Method
Participants and Design. Participants (n=111), undergraduate and graduate
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel
beginning sound) X 2 (mild, intense beginning sound) between-subjects design.

Selection of Sounds. All sounds included in the focal study were pre-tested for
their perceived intensity and novelty as separate factors. Sixty-one participants who did
not take part in the focal study were asked to listen to 27 sounds, which were each
approximately 16 seconds long. Sounds were presented in random order with short labels
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describing their content. As participants listened to each sound, they were asked to rate
their on-line affect on a scale including both valences, from “Very unpleasant” to “Very
pleasant.” Participants reported on-line affect by continuously moving a probe along this
scale as they listened to the sound. The average position of the probe over the 16-second
duration provided a measure of the sound’s valence and intensity. Considering these
measures, six sounds were selected to construct sequences in the focal study. Two sounds
were universal to all participants in the focal study. These sounds were labeled “A
mosquito buzzing close by” and “The busy signal for a telephone.” The mosquito sound
was rated the worst of all sounds. The sounds chosen for the intense beginning conditions
were “An electric razor being used to shave” (conventional) and “An electric surge
caused by a voltage spike” (novel), which resembled an electric distortion noise. These
sounds were rated to be significantly lower than the mid-point of the on-line affect scale,
indicating that participants found these sounds annoying. The two mild sounds selected
for the focal task, labeled “A helicopter hovering” (conventional) and “Beluga whales
communicating through clicking chatter” (novel), were rated to be less unpleasant than
the intense sounds and below but not significantly different from the mid-point of the
scale. For the focal study, these mild sounds were edited through sound software to be
slightly more unpleasant. I increased the volume of these two sounds so that they would
be experienced as unpleasant and not neutral sounds.

In the pre-test, a measure of novelty was also collected after the on-line affect rating for
each sound. Perceived novelty was operationalized in terms of a familiarity rating.
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Participants responded to the question, “How familiar are you with this sound or sounds
of this type?” using a scale from 1 (“Not at all familiar”) to 7 (“Very familiar”). The
helicopter and razor sounds were rated as more familiar than the surge and beluga whales
sounds, and the universal mosquito and busy signal sounds were also rated as more
familiar than the surge and beluga whales sounds. Thus, this pre-test was conducted to
identify sounds that differed in their intensity and novelty as separate factors. However,
the sounds may have been experienced with different levels of intensity in the focal
study, because the mild sounds were edited to be louder. As well, the focal study
involved a smaller subset of sounds, and participants’ on-line affect could depend on the
other sounds they had been exposed to. Consequently, I rely on on-line measures
collected during the focal study to control for intensity differences by novelty condition.

Procedure and Stimulus. In the focal study, participants listened to a three-sound
sequence at the beginning of a lab session. Although no cover story was provided,
participants were exposed to the sounds prior to evaluating a set of audio speakers in a
shopping task. As such, they may have inferred that their response to the sound would be
relevant for the subsequent task. The sound sequence was 48 seconds long: Each sound
was approximately 16 seconds long and there were no breaks between sounds.
Participants were asked to listen to the sounds through their head phones, and the sounds
played on a computer program. As they listened, a list of the sound labels was provided.
Participants listened to one of four sounds to begin the sequence depending on their
condition: conventional-intense (razor), novel-intense (surge), conventional-mild
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(helicopter), or novel-mild (beluga whales). The second and third sounds in the sequence
were mosquito and busy signal for all participants. Unlike the pre-test, in the focal study
participants did not provide ratings of on-line affect during the sequence itself. See figure
2 for a schematic depicting study 1.

FIGURE 2
Figure 2: Schematic depicting study 1.

Measures. After listening to the sound sequence, participants were asked to
provide an overall evaluation of the entire experience. Specifically, they were asked,
“Looking back at the entire experience, how unpleasant was listening to the sound
track?” They responded on an unmarked scale by moving a probe to a position on a line
anchored by “Not at all unpleasant” to “Very unpleasant.” This overall evaluation was
measured only on a negative valence because all sounds in the sequence had been pretested to be unpleasant, and even the mild sounds were unpleasant in the focal study. A
scale focused only on aversiveness allowed participants to provide more precise
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distinctions in overall evaluations. The probe’s singular position on the scale was
translated to a number from 0 to -100, with lower numbers indicating more overall
unpleasantness.

At the end of the lab session (M=35 minutes later), after participants completed other
unrelated studies they responded to a second set of measures. At this second stage,
participants were asked to report how familiar the individual sounds were to them using
the same familiarity scale that was employed in the pre-test. Participants then listened to
the entire sound sequence again, during which they responded to the on-line affect
measure. For the on-line measure, participants were asked to move a probe continuously
at every moment on a scale from “Not at all unpleasant” to “Very unpleasant” as they
listened to the sound. An on-line measure was not taken during the initial experience
itself, because prior research finds that measuring on-line affect can disrupt subjective
experience (see Ariely and Zauberman 2000). In particular, on-line measurement tends to
segment the experience more, reducing the effect of trend on overall evaluations. As well,
because participants may be engrossed in the experience they may not be able to provide
accurate concurrent ratings. In this study, a combination of an uninterrupted first play of
the sequence and a delayed, repeat of the experience with an on-line measure helps to
eliminate such disruption. The delay between the focal experience and its repeat was
included to minimize fatigue. This methodology has prior precedent for other temporallyextended affective experiences, and measuring on-line affect during a delayed, repeated
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presentation of an experience has been shown to be a useful and reliable proxy for
experienced affect (see Gottman and Levenson 1985).

Results
Manipulation Check. The novel set of sounds, surge and beluga whales, were
rated to be less familiar than the conventional set of sounds, razor and helicopter
(F(1,110)=52.19, p<.001). As well, the novel set of sounds were each less familiar than
the universal sounds, mosquito and busy signal (each planned contrast p<.0001).

Overall Evaluations. The overall evaluations of the sound sequence exhibited a
significant 2 (intensity of first sound) X 2 (novelty of first sound) interaction
(F(1,107)=10.55, p=.001). The overall evaluation for the sequence with the novel, intense
first sound (M= -73.76) was significantly worse than the overall evaluation for the
sequence with the novel, mild first sound (M= -56.12; t(55)=3.65, p<.001). On the other
hand, the overall evaluation for the conventional sound sequences were not different from
each other (t(52)=3.74,p >. 2). In fact, the direction of the influence was reversed: the
sequence with the conventional, mild first sound was rated as more unpleasant (M= 69.73) than the sequence with the conventional, intense first sound (M= -62.03); see
figure 3.
FIGURE 3
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Figure 3: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 1 as a function
of intensity and novelty of the first sound. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
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On-line Measures. The intense set of first sounds were rated to be worse on-line
than the mild set of first sounds, as reflected in their average of moment-to-moment
ratings (F(1,110)=110.35,p<.001). The planned contrasts were significant in both the
novel and conventional set of sounds (Conventional: MIntense = -55.96, MMild = -33.75;
Novel: MIntense = -71.49, MMild = -32.11; both p<.001). However, this effect was larger in
the novel set of sounds than in the conventional set of sounds (F(1,110)=8.57, p<.005).
This result lends some support to a positive relationship between affective intensity and
novelty, at least for the more intense set of sounds in this study (i.e., the novel surge
sound was more aversive than the conventional razor sound). The second and third
sounds were subject to hedonic contrast effects. The second sound (mosquito) was rated
to be worse on-line when it followed a mild first sound than when it followed an intense
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first sound (F(1,110)=11.85, p<.001). Similarly, the third sound (busy signal) was rated
as more unpleasant in the mild first sound conditions (F(1,110)=9.93, p<.005). These
hedonic contrast results may explain the reversal of overall evaluations in the
conventional sounds conditions. If only the peak intensity and end intensity are reflected
in overall evaluations, then overall evaluations would be more negative in the mild first
sound condition than in the intense first sound condition, because the mild beginning led
to more intense peaks and ends. On the other hand, if the intensity of the peak, end, and
first sound are all reflected in overall evaluations, then the mild first sound may mitigate
overall evaluations, as occurred in the novel condition.

Regression Analysis. To explain overall evaluations while controlling for intensity
differences by novelty condition, I regressed overall evaluations on participants’ on-line
affect measures. In each model, predictors of overall evaluations were peak intensity, end
intensity, novelty condition, a parameter based on on-line ratings collected during the
first sound, and an interaction term for that parameter by novelty condition. These models
account for two predictors established by prior theory: peak intensity and end intensity.
For peak intensity I extracted participants’ maximum rating of on-line affect for the entire
three-sound sequence. For end intensity I identified the mean of the last one second of
on-line affect from the third sound. I varied the parameter for the first sound to be either
the mean, median, or mode of on-line ratings collected during the first sound. The first
sound can also be thought of as a separable experience for which its own peak intensity
and end intensity may explain its remembered affect. As such, I extracted the peak
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intensity and end intensity of only the first sound on-line ratings and used the combined
peak-end to represent the affective response to the first sound. Thus, four models were
analyzed with varying parameters to represent on-line affect from the first sound. The
regression analyses revealed that peak intensity and end intensity (of the entire sequence)
are significant predictors of overall evaluations (p<.01 for both predictors in each
regression model). None of the four parameters based on the first sound on-line ratings is
a significant predictor of overall evaluations (p>.35 in each model). This result is
qualified by a significant interaction of the first sound parameter by novelty condition in
each model (see table 1). Overall evaluations are better predicted by on-line ratings
collected during the first sound in the novel than in the conventional condition. For
example, the mean on-line rating of the first sound predicted overall evaluations better
when the sound was novel than when it was conventional (t(105)=2.44, p=.016).
Because the novel-intense first sound (surge) was rated as worse on-line than the
conventional-intense first sound (razor), it was possible that the novel sound was more
likely to include the peak of the sequence, which might contribute to these results due to
peak intensity rather than novelty. However, in a restricted set of regression analyses, I
considered only situations in which the peak of the sequence was not experienced during
the first sound. Most participants experienced their peak only during the second sound,
mosquito. The restricted analyses exclude 8 participants in the conventional and 20
participants in the novel condition who also experienced their peak during the first sound.
The same interaction of first sound parameter by novelty condition held with these
restrictions (see table 1).
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TABLE 1:
Study 1 regression analysis results
Table 1: Study 1 overall evaluations of unpleasantness were regressed on to peak
intensity, end intensity, a dummy variable for novelty condition, a parameter representing
the on-line evaluation of the first sound, and an interaction between this parameter and
novelty condition. T-test values, listed below, test the significance of the interaction
between the parameter and novelty condition. If the interaction is positive, the parameter
had a larger influence on overall evaluations when the first sound was novel than when it
was conventional.
Parameter
based on first
sound on-line
ratings

All participants (n= 111)

Participants who did not
experience their peak during
the first sound (n= 83)

Mean
Median
Mode
Peak+End
Mean
Median
Mode
Peak+End

t

p value

2.44
2.68
2.67
2.23
2.19
2.58
2.47
3.00

.0162
.0086
.0088
.0279
.0317
.0118
.0155
.0037

R2 Change Analysis. The effect size of the interaction can be illustrated by
analyzing overall evaluations separately by novelty condition. I compared pairs of
regression models in each condition in order to determine whether the affective response
to the first sound accounted for significant unique variance in overall evaluations. In each
condition a baseline model with just the peak and end intensity was compared to a model
that includes one of the four parameters representing on-line affect derived from the first
sound. The marginal influence of the first sound parameter on overall evaluations can be
determined by the change in R2 from the baseline model to the larger model.
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Across all four parameters tested, affective response to the first sound accounted for
significant unique variance in overall evaluations when the first sound was novel but not
when it was conventional (see table 2). For example, when the first sound was
conventional, the smaller peak-end model accounted for 48.92% of the variance in
overall evaluations, whereas a larger model with peak and end intensity of the sequence
and the mean on-line rating of the first sound accounted for 49.15% of the variance. For
the conventional first sound conditions, the mean on-line rating of the first sound was not
a significant predictor of overall evaluations (b=.05, t(54)=.47, p>.6), and adding this
parameter did not improve the fit of the model (F(3,48)=0.07, p>.95). On the other hand,
when the first sound was novel, the smaller model accounted for only 24.78% of the
variance in overall evaluations, whereas the larger model accounted for 54.95% of the
variance. In this case, the mean on-line rating of the first sound significantly predicted
overall evaluations (b=0.45, t(57)=5.96, p<.001), and adding this parameter significantly
improved the fit of the model (F(3,51)=11.38, p<.001). These changes in R2 were
replicated across the other three parameters representing affective response to the first
sound (median, mode, and peak-end of on-line ratings during the first sound). The results
also held when the analysis was restricted to participants who did not experience their
peak during the first sound.
TABLE 2
Study 1 R2 change analysis results
Table 2: Study 1 overall evaluations were regressed on to on-line measures of affect. The
baseline model includes peak and end intensity as predictors of overall evaluations. The
larger, three-parameter models add one parameter representing on-line affect derived
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from the first sound. R2 values for these models are listed below by novelty condition. Pvalues are based on an R2 change analysis, comparing the larger model to the baseline
model.
R2 of model
REGRESSION MODEL:
BASELINE: Peak and end intensity
of sequence

All
participants
(n= 111)

Participants
who did not
experience
their peak
during the
first sound
(n= 83)

Peak and end intensity of sequence +
Mean rating of first
sound
Median rating of first
sound
Modal rating of first
sound
Peak+End rating of first
sound
BASELINE: Peak and end intensity
of sequence
Peak and end intensity of sequence +
Mean rating of first
sound
Median rating of first
sound
Modal rating of first
sound
Peak+End rating of first
sound

Conventional

Novel

48.92%

24.78%

49.15%

54.95%***

49.00%

55.06%***

49.09%

55.89%***

48.95%

57.11%***

27.35%

17.79%

27.36%

39.43%*

27.49%

42.62%**

27.36%

43.96%**

28.16%

48.85%***

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
Discussion
Study 1 found support for hypothesis 1, demonstrating that novel aspects of experiences
are more likely to influence overall evaluations than conventional aspects when these
aspects are not the peak or end of the experience. In this study, overall evaluations were
pulled in the direction of the affective response to a novel but not a conventional
beginning. This study also found that novelty is a separate factor from intensity. As
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reviewed earlier, novel aspects can be more or less intense than conventional aspects. In
this study, novelty was positively related to affective intensity. This relationship was
evident in the on-line affect ratings, but it does not explain the difference in how
influential the beginning sound’s intensity was on overall evaluations. The regression
analysis accounts for any differences in experienced affect. As well, the novel beginning
influenced overall evaluations at both intensity levels: The experience was considered
more unpleasant when the novel beginning was intense and less unpleasant when the
novel beginning was mild. This finding suggests that novelty is not an added measure
that only enhances or only diminishes overall evaluations. Instead, novelty increases the
influence of aspects of experiences on overall evaluations.

One potential limitation of this study is in the measurement of on-line affect. The
approach used here, measuring affect during a repeated presentation of the experience,
helps to mitigate disruption arising from on-line measurement (see Ariely and Zauberman
2000). This approach was motivated in part to reduce false negatives for testing on-line
intensity differences. During a repeated presentation participants were better able to use
the scale because they had been exposed to the entire range of stimuli and were not
distracted by uncertain incoming information. However, it is possible that this approach
introduces another set of concerns. Participants may have had expectations coming into
the second experience, and on-line intensity ratings may be assimilated to these
expectations. This possibility may be aggravated in the novel conditions, working against
the hypothesis: Participants in the novel conditions would have formed more extreme
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expectations because they had already provided more divergent overall evaluations.
Alternatively, if the replay is rated without drawing on expectations, this repeated
presentation may reveal reduced intensity differences if participants have adapted to the
stimuli, which would provide an alternative explanation to the results. These
measurement concerns can be explored in further studies that manipulate the timing of
on-line affect measures—either during the experience or during a repeat of the
experience.

The results from study 1 are peculiar to extended experiences that comprise sequences of
activity, in which novel aspects can become isolated when surrounded by conventional
aspects. The basic effect of novelty found in study 1 places novelty alongside intensity
and serial positioning as factors that influence the accessibility of aspects of experiences.
In the next study I test how novelty differs from other factors in determining overall
evaluations. Specifically, I examine the effect of novelty on immediate versus delayed
overall evaluations.

IX. Study 2: Manipulating the ending of annoying sounds
Study 2 tests hypothesis 2a, the prediction that novel aspects will have a more enduring
influence on overall evaluations than conventional aspects. I predict that the end intensity
of an experience will influence immediate overall evaluations, replicating prior research.
However, the end intensity of an experience will influence delayed overall evaluations
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only if it is novel. This study uses a methodology similar to that of study 1: On-line
experience was manipulated by including a conventional or novel sound to end a
sequence of annoying sounds.

Method
Participants and Design. Participants (n=207), undergraduate and graduate
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel
end sound) X 2 (intense, mild end sound) X 2 (immediate-and-delayed evaluation,
delayed-only evaluation) between-subjects design.

Procedure. This study also involved an annoying sounds sequence. The sounds
used in this study were the same as those in study 1, with the critical difference being that
the focal sound was moved to the end of the sequence. The first two sounds in the
sequence were “A mosquito buzzing close by” and “The busy signal for a telephone.”
The third sound in the sequence varied as 2 (conventional, novel) X 2 (mild, intense)
between-subjects design. The conventional sound was either “An electric razor being
used to shave” (intense) or “A helicopter hovering” (mild). The novel sound was either
“An electric surge caused by a voltage spike” (intense) or “Beluga whales
communicating through clicking chatter” (mild). Participants listened to the sounds in the
same way as in study 1, with the sequence coming at the beginning of the lab session.
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Measures. Participants provided the same overall evaluation as in study 1.
However, the timing of this measure varied. Some participants provided an overall
evaluation immediately after the sequence concluded. These participants also provided a
repeated measure at a second point in time, the end of the lab session. Other participants
only provided an overall evaluation after this delay. The delayed set of measures (M=36
minutes later) included the overall evaluation as well as the manipulation check of
novelty, the same one used in study 1 and the pre-test. In this study, participants were not
asked to provide an on-line measure of affect because such a measure was not necessary
for testing the hypothesis or controlling for intensity differences, as will be discussed
later. See figure 4 for a schematic depicting study 2.
FIGURE 4
Figure 4: Schematic depicting study 2.

Results
Manipulation Check. The novel set of sounds, surge and beluga whales, were
rated to be less familiar than the conventional set of sounds, razor and helicopter

68
(F(1,187)=57.82, p<.001). As well, the novel set of sounds were each less familiar than
the universal sounds, mosquito and busy signal (each planned contrast p<.0001).

Overall Evaluations. Combining the overall evaluations formed immediately after
the conclusion of the sequence with those formed only after a delay, there was a threeway interaction between the final sound’s intensity, its novelty, and the timing of the
overall evaluation (F(1, 192)=4.23, p=.04); see figure 5. The final sound’s intensity was
reflected in immediate overall evaluations regardless of novelty condition, but only in
delayed overall evaluations if the final sound was novel. There was also a main effect of
timing of evaluations: Overall evaluations were lower in the delayed measure (F(1,
192)=9.06, p<.01). In the following sections, these results are explained separately by the
timing of the measure.
FIGURE 5
Study 2: Between-subject, Immediate versus Delay-Only Comparison
Figure 5: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 2 as a function
of intensity and novelty of the final sound and timing of the overall evaluation. The left
hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured immediately after the end of the
experience, and the right hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured only after a
delay. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.

Overall Evaluation
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Immediate Overall Evaluations. For overall evaluations that were formed
immediately after the conclusion of the sequence (n=111), there was a main effect of the
final sound’s intensity such that ending the experience with an intense sound pulled down
overall evaluations (F(1, 107)=5.12, p<.01). There was no main effect of novelty (F(1,
107)=2.21, p>.14) and no interaction between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty
(F(1, 107)=1.07, p>.3). Planned contrasts revealed that the sequence with the
conventional, intense end sound was rated as significantly worse than the sequence with
the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -73.65, MMild= -57.05; t(51)=2.86, p<.001).
The sequence with the novel, intense end sound was also rated as worse than the
sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -61.6, MMild = -54.89), but this
difference was not significant (t(56)=0.91, p>.3).
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Delay-Only Overall Evaluations. Some participants (n=90) only provided an
overall evaluation after the delay. For these delayed overall evaluations the main effect of
the final sound’s intensity was muted (F(1, 86)=2.16, p>.14). There was no main effect
of novelty (F(1, 86)=0.24, p>.6), but there was a marginally significant interaction
between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty (F(1, 86)=2.78, p =.09). The sequence
with the conventional, intense end sound was rated as nearly equally bad as the sequence
with the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -72.4, MMild= -73.35; t(48)=0.18, p>.8).
On the other hand, the sequence with the novel, intense end sound was rated as worse
than the sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -78.05, MMild = -62.95,
t(38)=1.80, p=.08).

Delay-Repeated Overall Evaluations. The same participants who provided an
overall evaluation immediately after the sequence concluded also provided a second
delayed overall evaluation measure. Fewer participants (n=101) responded to the
repeated measure because 10 participants were not able to stay in the lab for the entire
duration of the study. Repeated overall evaluations exhibited results consistent with
immediate overall evaluations (see figure 6). There was a main effect of the final sound’s
intensity (F(1, 97)=8.07, p<.01). There was a marginal main effect of novelty (F(1,
97)=0.77, p=.08) and no interaction between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty
(F(1, 97)=0.91, p>.3). Planned contrasts revealed that the sequence with the
conventional, intense end sound was rated as significantly worse than the sequence with
the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -75.07, MMild= -56.8; t(46)=2.96, p<.005).
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The sequence with the novel, intense end sound was also rated as worse than the
sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -69.07, MMild= -60), but this difference
was not significant (t(51)=1.25, p>.2). A repeated measures model that includes withinsubjects effects for the timing of the overall evaluation measure shows that the main
effect of the final sound’s intensity, the main effect of novelty, and the interaction of
these stimulus characteristics on overall evaluation did not differ across the timing of the
measure (all p>.25). However, there was a marginal main effect of the timing of
evaluation: Overall evaluations were lower in the second measure (F(1, 97)=3.52,
p=.06).
FIGURE 6

Overall Evaluation

Study 2: Within-subject, Immediate versus Delay-Repeated Comparison
Figure 6: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 2 as a function
of intensity and novelty of the final sound and timing of the overall evaluation. The left
hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured immediately after the end of the
experience, and the right hand panel depicts repeated overall evaluations measured after a
delay. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Discussion
Study 2 provides evidence for hypothesis 2a, demonstrating that the end intensity of an
experience influences immediate evaluations, but the end intensity only influences
delayed evaluations if it is novel. Unlike study 1, on-line affect was not measured in this
study, because the pattern of means supports the temporal interaction interpretation. If
there were differences in intensity between the novel and conventional sounds, this
should be captured by the immediate overall evaluations when the experience was fresh
in memory. Instead, novelty only influenced overall evaluations after a delay. The
proposed explanation for this result is differences in memory interference and retrieval.
When the sequence of sounds had just been experienced, participants had little difficulty
in accessing the most recent sound they encountered, resulting in both conventional and
novel ends influencing overall evaluations. After a delay, conventional sounds were less
accessible because recency effects diminish for delayed memory tasks (Bjork and
Whitten 1974), and these sounds were similar to other sounds encountered outside of the
lab. In contrast, because the novel sounds were unique to the specific episode, they were
still accessible after a delay and continued to influence overall evaluations.

It is also noteworthy that delay-only overall evaluations differed from delay-repeated
overall evaluations, which were not influenced by novelty. When people form an overall
evaluation for the first time, their on-the-spot construction of the overall evaluation will
depend on which aspects are accessible at that time. However, once an overall evaluation
is formed, people might not completely re-interpret the experience on subsequent
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judgment occasions. Instead, they may rely to some extent on their earlier judgment
(Ariely and Zauberman 2003; Feldman and Lynch 1988). The differences between delayonly and delay-repeated overall evaluations found in this study suggest that people do not
always form spontaneous overall evaluations of affective experiences, lending support to
previous research with similar findings in other affective judgments (e.g., Novemsky and
Ratner 2003; Nunes and Novemsky 2008).

Whereas novelty influenced delay-only overall evaluations differently than delayrepeated overall evaluations, both measures exhibited some bias compared to immediate
evaluations. Specifically, overall evaluations were worse in the delay-repeated evaluation
compared to the immediate evaluation, replicating the main effect of timing of evaluation
found in the between-subjects comparison (i.e., immediate vs. delay-only overall
evaluations). Employing an unmarked sliding scale to measure overall evaluations
prevented participants from retrieving a specific number they had provided earlier. As
such, participants forming a delay-repeated overall evaluation were not retrieving their
earlier judgment directly, but instead were affected to some extent by bias in their
memory for the experience. The present investigation is silent on the source of such bias.
However, based on prior research, one could argue that participants relied on a more
extreme theory-driven memory for the annoying sounds experience when forming
delayed overall evaluations (Robinson and Clore 2002). Alternatively, evaluations may
have worsened over time due to the particular context of the later evaluation (e.g.,
incidental mood was translated into more unpleasant memories of the annoying sounds).
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If delay-repeated judgments were also biased why were these judgments not influenced
by novelty? One plausible explanation is that rendering an immediate overall evaluation
helped participants encode the experience. Even if delay-repeated judgments were biased,
they were not completely baseless as participants were still able to incorporate
differences in end intensity. This result may be specific to the experimental context, and
it is possible that other judgment domains may show delay-repeated evaluations
converging to delay-only evaluations. In many experiences that are not directly
monitored, people’s overall evaluations may not be so explicitly stated, resulting in
poorer encoding of immediate attitudes and lesser correspondence between immediate
and delay-repeated overall evaluations. Consequently, in those situations novelty may
also have an impact on delay-repeated overall evaluations. Further studies can test
different forms of measuring overall evaluations to examine if immediate overall
evaluations would still concur with delay-repeated overall evaluations with these other
measurements.

One alternative explanation for the set of findings in this study is that encountering novel
aspects encourages spontaneous evaluations, resulting in better correspondence between
immediate and delay-only overall evaluations in the novel conditions. However, although
encountering a novel aspect may lead participants to spontaneously encode their on-line
affect, it is less likely that they would spontaneously summarize the overall experience
investigated here. The experience was designed without a script, the three sounds were
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loosely tied, and the study did not have a cover story. I argue that in this context people
would only form an overall evaluation when they were asked to consider all three sounds
together. Otherwise, participants had no purpose for evaluating the entire experience in
terms of one summarized assessment. On the other hand, one could speculate in more
naturalistic experiences that encountering a novel aspect may enhance consumers’
monitoring of the overall experience, which would contribute to the results due to more
spontaneous immediate construction of an overall evaluation.

Further, the amount of time used for the delay in this study should be generalized with
caution. This study involved a short affective experience lasting only 48 seconds with
little sensory information. Participants did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the
experience as they would with goal-directed experiences. In this study, approximately 35
minutes was sufficient for evaluations to differ systematically, driven by novelty and a
general worsening of evaluations. One might imagine that for a more involving
experience, such as a week-long vacation, a longer delay would be necessary to reveal
such discrepancies between immediate and delayed overall evaluations.

As with study 1, this study investigates how novelty influences the accessibility and
weighting of aspects in overall evaluations of affect. Study 2 demonstrates that one aspect
of an experience, its end, has an immediate influence on overall evaluations that does not
depend on novelty, but it has a delayed influence that is strengthened by novelty. In the
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next study I examine delayed overall evaluations of experiences in which the novelty of
the entire experience is varied.

X.

Study 3: Fractals study

Study 3 tests hypothesis 2b, the prediction that overall evaluations will be more accurate,
reflecting on-line affect, if an experience is unique versus if an experience is common.
This study used a different methodology compared to study 1 and 2. On-line affect was
measured for an experience in which participants viewed pleasant artistic shapes. Novelty
was reduced through prior exposure. In this study, a relatively novel set of images was
presented, which was not unique for some participants due to prior exposure to similar
images. As such, this study tests a dimension of novelty—amount of accumulated
experience—and focuses on the interference mechanism predicted by the isolation effect
research.

Method
Participants and Design. Participants (n=64), undergraduate and graduate
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a one factor betweensubjects design in which the entire experience was or was not unique: Participants were
either exposed to (n=34) or not exposed (n=30) to similar images in the recent past as a
manipulation of experience frequency.
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Procedure. The focal experience in this study was viewing a series of artistic
shapes on a computer program. The shapes selected for this task were all fractal images
culled from a website that included a gallery of fractals. A fractal is a shape that can be
split into parts, each of which is approximately a microcosm of the whole shape.
Mathematicians study fractals because they have properties similar to shapes from the
natural world, such as coastlines and snowflakes. Consumers also enjoy looking at
fractals, which are sometimes depicted in posters and screensavers. Due to the welldefined mathematical properties of fractals, new fractal images can be created by
computer programs, leading to a proliferation of distinct images with similar appearance.
See figure 7 for a sample of a fractal displayed in the focal experience.
FIGURE 7
Figure 7: Example of a fractal image displayed in the focal experience for study 3.
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The study proceeded in three stages within the lab session. See figure 8 for a schematic
depicting the stages of the study. At the beginning of the session, participants were either
exposed to 20 images of fractals or no images as a between-subjects manipulation of
prior exposure. The images were displayed on a computer screen. The computer program
advanced each image after an exposure period of 2.2 seconds. Participants who viewed
these images were not asked to report their on-line affect, and no cover story was
provided for the image viewing task. Participants in the unique experience condition
instead engaged in other lab studies, which were not related to fractals or viewing images.
After this first stage of the study, all participants moved on to other unrelated
experiments in the lab session.

FIGURE 8
Figure 8: Schematic depicting the three stages of study 3.
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In the second stage, M=25 minutes later all participants saw a set of seven focal images.
These seven images were different from the 20 that participants in the prior exposure
condition viewed earlier. Participants controlled the pace at which they viewed the seven
images, and they responded to an on-line measure of affect. The first of the seven images
was viewed the longest (M=5.42 seconds), but all other images were viewed very briefly
(range from M=2.33 seconds to M=3.21 seconds). This second stage of the study, which
comprised the entire viewing task, was brief (M=21.53 seconds).

After viewing the images, participants moved on to stage three, which included the delay
and the overall evaluation measure. Immediately after the fractal viewing experience, all
participants experienced a delay lasting approximately five minutes. During this delay,
participants listened to the theme song from Chariots of Fire and read three short poems:
'Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening' by Robert Frost, 'There is another sky' by
Emily Dickinson, and 'Composed Upon Westminster Bridge' by William Wordsworth.
These traditional artistic experiences were selected to occupy participants’ time so that
they would not be aggravated by an empty wait. After these other tasks concluded,
participants responded to the overall evaluation measure.

Measures. As they viewed the focal set of fractal images, participants were asked
to rate each image for its on-line enjoyment. Specifically, participants were asked “How
much do you enjoy looking at this image?” They responded on a 15-point scale from 1
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(“Not at all”) to 15 (“Very much”). After they clicked on a response, the computer
program advanced and displayed the next image with the same rating scale.

The key delayed measure was the overall evaluation of the experience. In an instructions
section provided prior to this measure, participants in the unique experience condition
were asked to consider the images they saw, whereas participants in the prior exposure
condition were asked to focus only on the most recent set of images they saw. This
instruction was necessary to ensure that prior exposure condition participants would
focus on the same set of images as those considered by participants in the unique
experience condition. For participants in the prior exposure condition the approximately
half-hour delay between the prior exposure task and the focal experience, the stark
differences in the number of images (20 vs. 7), and the procedural differences in viewing
experience (images that automatically advanced as a slideshow versus images that were
controlled through on-line affect ratings) helped to alleviate any confusion as to which set
of images the overall evaluation was referring to. All participants were asked, “Overall,
how much did you enjoy looking at these images?” Their responses were collected on an
unmarked sliding scale that resembled the overall evaluation scale used in studies 1 and
2: Participants moved a probe to a position on a line anchored by “Did not enjoy at all” to
“Enjoyed a lot.” The probe’s singular position on the scale was translated to a number
from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more overall enjoyment.
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Results
On-line Measures. Ratings of enjoyment during the image viewing experience revealed
some differences by frequency condition. The average of on-line ratings across all seven
images differed marginally: Participants who viewed fractal images previously enjoyed
the focal experience less than participants for whom the focal experience was unique
(MPrior Exposure=7.55, MUnique=8.91; t(62)=1.80, p=.08). An image-by-image analysis
suggests that this result was driven by the low of the experience, defined as the least
enjoyed image. The low for participants in the prior exposure condition was less enjoyed
than the low for participants in the unique experience condition (MPrior Exposure=3.97,
MUnique=5.66; t(62)=2.03, p=.04). No specific image was the low for all participants, but
two images exhibited significantly less enjoyment in the prior exposure condition: the
first image (t(62)=2.38, p=.02) and the fourth image (t(62)=2.26, p=.03). As such, this
study finds a negative relationship between experience frequency and intensity of
enjoyment, at least for two images and the low of the experience. However, the peak of
the experience, defined as the most enjoyed image, did not differ in enjoyment by
frequency condition (MPrior Exposure=11.53, MUnique=12.3; t(62)=1.20, p=.23). Because
only ten participants (3 in the prior exposure and 7 in the unique experience condition)
maxed out on the scale for rating their most enjoyed image, this lack of difference is
unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect. The end of the experience (i.e., the final image in
the sequence) also did not differ in enjoyment by frequency condition (MPrior Exposure=7.58,
MUnique=8.36; t(62)=0.77, p=.44).
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Overall Evaluations. The delayed overall evaluation for the viewing experience did not
differ by frequency condition. Participants who had viewed fractal images previously
evaluated the focal experience as being just as enjoyable in retrospect as participants who
had not viewed fractal images previously (MPrior Exposure=59.24, MUnique=62.94; t(62)=0.69,
p=.49).

Regression Analysis. The main outcome of interest in this study was and the extent to
which delayed overall evaluations reflected on-line affect. There were seven measures of
on-line affect in this study, each based on one of the seven images displayed. Regressing
the delayed overall evaluation on all seven of these measures resulted in different
coefficients of determination for the regression model by frequency condition. The seven
on-line ratings accounted for only 39% of the variation in overall evaluations for the prior
exposure condition but 70% of the variation in overall evaluations for the unique
experience condition. However, in either condition this regression model was inefficient:
None of the on-line measures significantly predicted overall evaluations when all seven
measures were included in the model. In addition, the overall trend of the experience,
defined as the linear trend of all seven on-line measures for each participant, was not a
significant predictor of overall evaluations when considered alone in a regression analysis
(p>.5 for both conditions). On the other hand, the mean of on-line measures and each
individual on-line measure was a significant predictor of overall evaluations when
considered in separate regression analyses (with the exception of the third on-line
measure in the prior exposure condition). As well, each predictor explained more of the
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variation in overall evaluations for the unique experience condition than for the prior
exposure condition (see table 3).
TABLE 3
Study 3 regression analysis results, beta coefficients
Table 3: Predictors of overall enjoyment of the fractal viewing experience in study 3.
Overall evaluations were regressed on to each predictor in separate regression models.
Beta coefficients for each predictor are provided for the combined analysis as well as the
separate analyses for each frequency condition.

Mean
Trend
Peak
Low
Image 1
Image 2
Image 3
Image 4
Image 5
Image 6
Image 7(end)

Combined analysis
N=64
0.72***
-0.01
0.55***
0.59***
0.65***
0.56***
0.44***
0.55***
0.55***
0.66***
0.62***

Prior exposure
condition
N=34
0.59***
0.11
0.33*
0.56***
0.5**
0.38*
0.24
0.43**
0.47**
0.57***
0.51**

Unique
experience
condition N=30
0.82***
-0.09
0.71***
0.62***
0.77***
0.72***
0.65***
0.67***
0.64***
0.74***
0.69***

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001

The peak of on-line ratings is a theoretically informed predictor of overall evaluations.
Peak intensity accounted for 11% of the variation in overall evaluations for the prior
exposure condition and 51% of the variation in overall evaluations for the unique
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experience condition. In order to test whether peak intensity determined overall
evaluations differently by frequency condition, I combined both conditions in a
regression analysis. Specifically, I regressed overall evaluations on the on-line peak
intensity, a dummy variable for frequency condition, and the interaction of peak intensity
by frequency condition. This model resulted in a significant peak by frequency condition
interaction (t(60)=2.27, p=.03), suggesting that the peak intensity had a larger influence
on overall evaluations when the experience was unique.

One potential explanation for this interaction may be that the peak was more intense in
the unique experience condition, resulting in the peak being more accessible in the unique
experience than in the prior exposure condition. Although participants’ rating of their
peak did not differ by condition (t(62)=1.20, p=.23), the subjective intensity of their
peak might also depend on the intensity of the other aspects they had experienced in the
focal episode. In further analyses I normalized peak intensity by including relevant
control variables in separate regression analyses. The peak by frequency condition
interaction was significant even when including each of the following predictors as
control variables to normalize peak intensity: the mean of other on-line ratings
(t(59)=1.98, p=.05), the range of on-line ratings—by extension, the low of on-line ratings
(t(59)=2.35, p=.02), and the kurtosis of distribution of on-line ratings, which captured the
peakedness of on-line ratings (t(59)=2.27, p=.02). As well, 23 participants rated more
than one image at their peak level, but including the number of peaks as a control
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variable still resulted in a significant peak by frequency condition interaction in the
regression analysis (t(59)=2.09, p=.04).

The peak by frequency condition interaction is particularly relevant to existing theory.
Moreover, this interaction was also replicated for other aspects of the experience. This
suggests that delayed overall evaluations reflect general loss of on-line affect for
previously exposed but not unique experiences, and this loss of on-line affect is not just
contained to peak intensity. I performed additional regression analyses separately for all
seven on-line measures. In each analysis, overall evaluations were regressed on to one
on-line measure, a dummy variable for frequency condition, and the interaction of the online measure by frequency condition (see table 4). These analyses revealed that the
interaction was directionally consistent across all seven on-line measures: Each on-line
measure had a larger influence on overall evaluations when the experience was unique.
Three of these interactions were significant (for the second, third, and fourth on-line
measures), one interaction was marginally significant (for the first on-line measure), and
three interactions were not significant (the fifth, sixth, and seventh on-line measures).
Moreover, regressing overall evaluations on the mean of on-line measures, frequency
condition, and the interaction of the mean by condition resulted in a marginally
significant interaction (t(60)=1.70, p=.09). Although the mean is based on seven on-line
measures, as an individual parameter it models overall evaluations most parsimoniously,
accounting for the greatest variance in overall evaluations in each condition. As well, no
other predictor accounts for significant unique variance in overall evaluations beyond the
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mean of on-line measures. Due to high correlation between on-line measures, overall
evaluations can also be predicted well by fewer on-line measures, but no model predicts
overall evaluations better in the prior exposure condition than in the unique experience
condition.
TABLE 4
Study 3 regression analysis results, interaction terms
Table 4: Study 3 T-test values for the interaction between each predictor of overall
enjoyment and frequency condition. Overall evaluations were regressed on to each
predictor in separate regression models. Each model also included a dummy variable for
frequency condition and the interaction of the predictor by frequency condition.
t

p value

Mean

1.7

.09

Mean excluding peak

1.79

.08

Trend

-0.77

.44

Peak

2.27

.03

Mean of non-peak on-line measures

1.98

.05

Range of on-line measures

2.35

.02

Kurtosis of distribution for on-line measures

2.27

.03

Number of peaks

2.09

.04

Image 1

1.83

.07

Image 2

2.45

.01

Image 3

2.77

.01

Image 4

1.96

.05

Image 5

1.62

.11

Image 6

1.61

.11

Image 7 (end)

1.14

.26

Peak controlling for:
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Discussion
This study provides evidence for hypothesis 2b, demonstrating that delayed overall
evaluations are more reflective of on-line affect if the experience is unique. From the
standpoint of existing theory it is particularly noteworthy that the peak intensity had a
larger influence on overall evaluations when the experience was unique. This provides a
moderator of the peak’s influence on overall evaluations. As well, the greater influence of
peak intensity on overall evaluation in the unique experience condition was not offset by
other aspects having a larger influence on overall evaluations in the prior exposure
condition. Instead, each on-line measure explained overall evaluations better in the
unique experience condition than in the prior exposure condition.

If delayed overall evaluations in the prior exposure condition were less likely to capture
on-line affect, what else might these overall evaluations reflect? Consistent with the
isolation effect research, I argue that participants in the prior exposure condition were
unable to access their on-line affect from the focal episode because their previous
experiences interfered when they were forming delayed overall evaluations. As such, one
predictor of overall evaluations could be the affect participants experienced in previous,
related episodes. Participants’ on-line affect for the previously viewed images was not
measured in this study. In a future study it would be useful to measure on-line affect for
initial experiences and to examine whether these on-line measures predict overall
evaluations for a later, focal experience.
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Whereas in studies 1 and 2 novelty was pre-tested for different stimuli, in this study
novelty was manipulated through prior exposure. This alternative approach for
manipulating novelty disentangles novelty from other domain-specific stimulus
characteristics, because all participants in study 3 rated the same set of focal images.
Thus, this study establishes that a dimension of novelty—amount of accumulated
experience—affects the accessibility of the experience in overall evaluations of affect. By
examining degree of prior experience at one range of a continuum (i.e., from unique to
less novel) instead of a broader spectrum (i.e., from novel to conventional), this study
isolates the role of memory interference. Yet, there could be other mechanisms in
retrospective evaluations that occur over wider ranges of prior experience. In fact, as
people accumulate a great deal of experience in a domain, they may form enduring
affective representations of these experiences, which might tie on-line and remembered
affect together (Breckler 1994; Breckler and Wiggins 1989, 1993). This possibility will
be discussed later in the dissertation.

XI. Study 4: Browsing study
Study 4 tests hypothesis 3, the prediction that more accumulated experience in a domain
will improve recall of attribute quality levels, but diminish recall for on-line affect, as
revealed by retrospective evaluations. This study also generalizes the study of novelty to
a different domain: a consumer browsing experience. Consumers visiting web-based and
retail stores are regularly exposed to sequences of options when they browse through
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items in a product category. Evaluating these search experiences retrospectively,
consumers may recall the quality levels of available options or their subjective shopping
experience. Such evaluations also exhibit effects identified in the snapshot model
literature. Diehl and Zauberman (2005) found that when product sets were extensively
searched overall evaluations were more positive for sequences with improving orderings
of options compared to those with declining orderings—an effect predicted by the
preference for improving trends.

In this study, on-line affect and encountered information were jointly manipulated in the
focal browsing experience. Overall evaluations were either based on encountered
information (quality levels of options) or experienced affect (satisfaction with the
browsing experience). Degree of novelty was manipulated by subsequent exposure to
similar browsing experiences. Thus, this study reveals how amount of accumulated
experience—a dimension of novelty—influences both learning and memory interference
in overall evaluations of experiences.

Method
Participants and Design. Participants (n=189), undergraduate and graduate
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (common, unique focal
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browsing experience) X 2 (improving, declining final trend of focal browsing experience)
X 2 (informational, hedonic overall evaluation) between-subjects design.

Procedure. This study proceeded in three stages: (1) a focal browsing experience,
(2) decoy browsing experiences, and (3) delayed evaluations. Each stage is described
separately. See figure 9 for a schematic depicting the three stages of the study.
FIGURE 9
Figure 9: Schematic depicting the three stages of study 4.

Stage 1: Focal browsing experience
In the focal experience, participants engaged in a browsing task in which they examined
jogging stroller options in a simulated web-based store called ‘Store A.’ Since
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participants were overwhelmingly child-less undergraduate students, few participants
were expected to have prior experience in this product category. As such, the product
category was explained to participants in an instructions section (see figure 10).
FIGURE 10
Figure 10: Instructions section for study 4.

Consistent with the agent-search procedure followed by Diehl and Zauberman (2005),
study 4 participants were asked to consider jogging stroller profiles according to another
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consumer’s preferences. Specifically, they were instructed to browse through the options
as if they were searching for a stroller for a parent interested in making a purchase.
Strollers were to be described on two characteristics: “maneuverability” and “comfort for
baby.” Participants were told to weight comfort twice as much as maneuverability when
assessing each option. The Store A sequence involved seven product profiles, numbered
1 through 7. Each product was described on the two attributes using horizontal bars filled
at different levels to reflect performance on each attribute (see figure 11). Participants
controlled the pace at which they viewed the product profiles, and each profile was
generally viewed briefly (M=3.04 seconds).

FIGURE 11
Figure 11: Example of jogging stroller profile for study 4.

Participants could infer the utility of each jogging stroller option based on the levels of
fill for its horizontal bars. Although numerical attribute values were not provided, these
values could be assessed visually. Each bar was filled at a percentage level in the range of
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5% to 95% in increments of 10% (i.e., 5%, 15%, 25%, etc.). The first three product
profiles were the same for all participants. However, attribute quality levels for profiles 4
– 7 were manipulated by final trend condition: Participants in the declining final trend
condition were exposed to product profiles with declining performance on both attributes,
whereas participants in the improving final trend condition were exposed to improving
product profiles (see table 5). Participants were not informed about the trend of the
sequence directly, but instead were to discover it independently. An improving final trend
would lead to higher average quality ratings and was expected to lead to more satisfaction
with the search process.

TABLE 5
Study 4 attribute quality levels for focal browsing experience
Table 5: Performance on each attribute for the seven product profiles in the focal
browsing sequence of study 4. Attribute values represent the percentage of the bar filled
in the graphical depiction of attribute performance. Profiles 1 through 3 are the same, but
profiles 4 – 7 differ by final trend condition.
Condition:

Profile #

1

Declining
final trend

Maneuverability (%)

55 65 55 45 25 15 15

Comfort for baby (%)

75 65 25 15 35

Maneuverability (%)

55 65 55 75 85 65 85

Comfort for baby (%)

75 65 25 65 85 85 95

Improving
final trend

2

3

4

5

6

7

5 25

Total utility of each option could be calculated as performance on maneuverability plus
performance on comfort for baby, weighted twice. Thus, converting percentage values to
points, the maximum utility of each option was 300 points (both attributes at 100%).
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Product profiles ranged in total utility from 25 points to 275 points (see figure 12). The
average total utility was M=109.29 points for the declining final trend sequence and
M=210.71 points for the improving final trend sequence.

FIGURE 12
Figure 12: Total utility of each option in the focal browsing sequences of study 4.
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Stage 2: Decoy browsing experiences
After browsing through focal Store A, participants visited the other simulated
web-based stores, B, C, and D, which offered the decoy browsing experiences. In an
instructions section provided to participants immediately after the focal browsing
sequence, some participants were told that they would browse through three more webbased stores that would feature jogging strollers. Other participants were told that they
would browse through three web-based stores that would offer backpacks. As such,
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through subsequent exposure to sequences, the focal experience’s product domain would
either be common or unique. In addition, participants were instructed to either focus on
the quality of options they would see (informational evaluation condition) or their search
satisfaction with the browsing process (hedonic evaluation condition) as they browsed
through the decoy stores. Specifically, they were told to either “think about the quality of
(jogging strollers, backpacks) available at each store” (informational) or to “think about
how you feel about the search process” (hedonic). This instruction to focus on
informational or hedonic aspects of the experience was provided before and after the
presentation of each sequence. Importantly, this instruction was also provided
immediately after the focal sequence.

The subsequent sequences of jogging strollers that participants saw in the commonexperience condition offered the same type of product profiles as in Store A. However,
these decoy stores differed in their pattern of quality, number of options, and presentation
format. Each decoy store had an average total utility of 165 points across its jogging
stroller profiles. As such, the average quality of these three decoy stores’ offerings was
roughly halfway between the two manipulated levels of focal Store A (i.e., between
109.29 and 210.71). None of the subsequent stores had a discernable trend of quality (see
figure 13). Store B featured 11 options, whereas Store C had five and Store D had eight
jogging stroller profiles respectively. Store D’s jogging stroller profiles were presented at
a pre-determined pace, 3.2 seconds per profile. In contrast, participants were able to
control the pace at which they viewed profiles in stores B and C. Finally, each store was
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also associated with a particular background color (blue for Store B, yellow for Store C,
and orange for Store D) which differed from the background color of Store A (green).
These differences aided participants’ ability to discriminate between stores and ensured
that participants would experience different levels of search satisfaction by store.
Additionally, the varying patterns of total utility could help participants learn about the
range of average quality across stores.

FIGURE 13
Figure 13: Total utility of each option in the subsequent (decoy) browsing sequences of
study 4.
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Participants who browsed through backpack sequences engaged in a similar task but in a
different domain. These participants examined 11 backpacks in Store B, five in Store C,
and 8 in Store D. The color and presentation time used in these backpack stores were also
equivalent to the jogging stroller stores. However, rather than assessing products by
reading graphical bars, participants viewed pictures of different backpacks and were
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presented the corresponding names of backpack models (see figure 14). Actual brand
names and backpack pictures were provided, extracted from Amazon.com listings.
Participants were instructed to browse through the backpacks, assessing quality according
to their own preferences. Thus, the quality patterns for these stores were not controlled
experimentally.
FIGURE 14
Figure 14: Example of backpack profile for study 4.

Stage 3: Delayed evaluations
After completing the browsing sequences in stores B, C, and D, participants
moved on to other, unrelated tasks in the lab. After this delay (M=27.78 minutes)
participants were prompted to recall the focal browsing sequence in Store A: They were
asked to form a retrospective evaluation of either the average quality levels of jogging
strollers or their overall satisfaction with the search process. Zauberman et al.’s (2006)
studies similarly manipulated type of evaluation through different prompts. In this study,
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participants in the informational evaluation condition first were asked to reproduce the
average performance of each attribute using unmarked sliding scales. They then were
asked, “What was the average quality level of Store A's jogging strollers?” They
responded using a 100-point scale to provide this direct estimate. Participants in the
hedonic evaluation condition only formed a direct overall evaluation of their search
satisfaction. They were asked: “Recall your experience searching for a high quality
jogging stroller in online Store A. Overall, how satisfied did you feel with the search at
this store?” For both the informational and hedonic direct estimates, participants
responded by inputting a number between 0 and 100 in a textbox, where higher numbers
indicated higher average quality levels or overall satisfaction.

Participants were also asked about the perceived novelty of browsing in each product
category. First, participants were asked how familiar they were with the jogging stroller
product category, which they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all familiar”) to 7
(“Very familiar”). Second, they were asked how often they use a jogging stroller, which
they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Never”) to 7 (“Very often”). Third, they were
asked how knowledgeable they were about jogging strollers, which they responded to on
a scale from 1 (“Not at all knowledgeable”) to 7 (“Very knowledgeable”). Participants
then answered the same three questions for the backpack product category.
Results
Manipulation Checks
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Participants rated the backpack browsing experience as much less novel than the jogging
stroller browsing experience, as revealed by paired differences in the three novelty
manipulation check questions (all t(189)>22, all p<.0001).

Retrospective evaluations with no statistical controls
While hedonic evaluations were only measured directly, informational evaluations were
measured in two ways: by directly recalling average total utility and by reproducing
average attribute quality levels. Thus, total utility could be calculated by using
participants’ recalled performance for maneuverability and comfort for baby, adding the
two values and doubling the weight for comfort. This calculated estimate correlated
highly with directly provided judgments (r(93)=0.67, p<.0001). I report analyses based
on directly provided judgments; analyses based on calculated estimates are equivalent.

A basic model including all between-subjects factors and their interactions revealed that
neither the three-way interaction nor any of the two-way interactions were significant
(F(1, 181)<1 in all cases), but significant main effects were obtained (see figure 15). As
expected, evaluations were higher for the improving final trend sequences compared to
the declining final trend sequences (F(1, 181)=32.55, p<.0001). Evaluations were more
positive when the browsing experience was common compared to when it was unique
(F(1, 181)=5.65, p=.02), and evaluations were also higher for hedonic compared to
informational evaluations (F(1, 181)=9.72, p<.01). These latter two results were
peripheral to the main phenomenon of interest and were not anticipated by the
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hypotheses. I remain agnostic as to their underlying causes, but stimulus calibration may
be responsible. The main effect of experience frequency could occur simply as a
byproduct of the stimuli employed (e.g, Store A was seen in a more positive light when
compared to stores B, C, and D). The main effect of evaluation type could be a result of
differences in scale usage, or it could indicate that participants were largely satisfied with
the search experience, even if the average quality of options was more modest.
FIGURE 15

Overall Evaluation

Study 4: Overall analysis of retrospective evaluations
Figure 15: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend.
The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining
final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean.
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Retrospective evaluations, controlling for immediate evaluation time
The results reported above were not consistent with the predictions set prior to the study.
Specifically, a three-way interaction was predicted: It was expected that retrospective
evaluations would track final trend differences for informational evaluations only when
the experience was common and for hedonic evaluations only when the experience was
unique. Instead, final trend differences were large regardless of the frequency of the
experience or the form of retrospective evaluation.

These results suggest that participants were highly accurate in their recall for both
attribute levels and experienced satisfaction. The tendency for participants to form
immediate assessments may explain this ceiling effect on accuracy of recall. As such, in
further analyses I examined the role of time spent on the decoy experiences, when
participants were likely to form on-line impressions of each subsequent sequence and the
focal browsing experience. Presumably, participants who spent more time on this second
stage were likely to more carefully form immediate impressions, mitigating any effect of
the other manipulated factors. It should be noted that this control was not manipulated as
part of the experimental design a priori, but instead was selected due to the finding that
participants were highly accurate in their recall.

A larger model that included all manipulated factors and their interactions as well as time
spent on stage two of the study and its interaction with the other variables obtains the
effect predicted. This analysis finds no main effect of final trend (F(1, 173)=0.01, p>.9),
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no main effect of experience frequency (F(1, 173)=1.41, p>.2), and only a marginally
significant effect of type of evaluation (F(1, 173)=3.51, p=.06). However, there was a
significant three-way interaction between final trend, experience frequency, and type of
evaluation (F(1, 173)=6.37, p=.01) as well as a significant four-way interaction where
this effect was moderated by amount of time spent on the second stage of the study (F(1,
173)=4.83, p=.03).

The median time spent on the second stage of the study was 32 seconds. Using the
median split of this variable as an additional factor in an analysis would result in
insufficient power (see Irwin and McClelland 2003). Nonetheless, I describe the pattern
of means along a median split for expositional purposes. This pattern is consistent with
the predictions for participants who spent less than the median time on the second stage
of the study. When these participants were judging the average quality level of the focal
browsing sequence, uniqueness led to less accurate recalled quality ratings. Final trend
effects were large when the sequence was common (MDown = 49.67, MUp = 72.38) but
very small when the sequence was unique (MDown = 41, MUp = 45.88). On the other hand,
when participants evaluated their overall satisfaction with the search process final trend
effects were non-existent when the sequence was common (MDown = 69, MUp = 71.29) but
larger when the sequence was unique (MDown = 63.75, MUp = 73.89). See figure 16.
FIGURE 16
Study 4: Analysis of retrospective evaluations, less time on second stage
Figure 16: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend.
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Overall Evaluation

The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining
final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. These values only include participants who spent
less than the median time on the second stage of the study.
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When participants spent more time on the second stage of the study final trend
differences were not moderated by evaluation type or experience frequency. Instead, final
trend differences were large across conditions (see figure 17). Other ways of splitting the
data reveal similar patterns.

FIGURE 17
Study 4: Analysis of retrospective evaluations, more time on second stage
Figure 17: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend.
The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining
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Overall Evaluation

final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean. These values only include participants who spent
more than the median time on the second stage of the study.
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Discussion
Study 4 demonstrates prior experience’s differing effects on informational versus hedonic
evaluations of experiences. I argue that this interaction stems from different memory
mechanisms involved in each case. For informational evaluations, additional experience
helps consumers learn attribute values and rehearse the focal sequence, resulting in
consumers recalling more about the information presented during common experiences.
In this study, participants who viewed subsequent jogging stroller sequences had more
exposure to the range of attribute values, which would provide a more informed frame by
which to evaluate the focal episode’s attributes. On the other hand, for affective
evaluations, additional experience resulted in memory interference, which prevented
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participants from uniquely accessing their on-line affect from the focal sequence. Though
interference likely figured even in recall for informational attributes, this effect was offset by the enhanced learning of these attributes. Notably, additional experience did not
aid in learning of on-line affect, consistent with the argument that affect is a global
response that can be recalled without a domain-specific cognitive structure.

In this study the interaction between experience frequency and type of evaluation on
overall evaluations was further moderated by the amount of time participants spent in the
second stage of the study. Although not anticipated a priori, I argue that this measure of
time spent serves as a proxy for how carefully participants formed immediate evaluations
of the focal and subsequent sequences. For participants who were asked to pay attention
to average quality levels, effortful processing would result in greater rehearsal of the
focal sequence’s average quality levels as well as greater encoding of the subsequent
sequences. As such, recall for average quality of the focal sequence would likely be very
accurate, reflecting experienced trends. For participants who were asked to pay attention
to their experienced affect, effortful processing would result in participants forming
spontaneous impressions of search satisfaction. Thus, these participants’ memories were
neither enhanced nor diminished by novelty, because there was a ceiling effect on how
accurate their memories could be. It is difficult to explain the pattern of results by
variables confounded with time spent on the second stage, such as enjoyment in the
study, need for cognition, etc. While manipulating degree of effort would be a useful
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extension, results based on measured effort captures people’s own tendencies to form
immediate impressions.

This study also generalizes the investigation to a different domain, manipulation of
experienced affect, and manipulation of novelty. This study replicates past findings in the
marketing literature, revealing that snapshot model effects are also relevant for
consumers’ browsing experiences (e.g., Diehl and Zauberman 2005). Experienced affect
was manipulated through the final trend of the focal sequence, whereas studies 1 and 2
manipulated one moment of the focal episode (i.e., start and end), and in study 3
experienced affect was measured. Finally, this study manipulates novelty through
subsequent exposure to similar experiences. As such, the initial sequence was similarly
involving and intense for all participants, but at the time of a delayed overall evaluation
the experience had become more common for some participants. This methodology
addresses the limitations of previous manipulations of novelty (i.e., measuring novelty or
manipulating prior experience).

Like study 3, this study focuses on frequency of experience as a dimension of novelty.
The domain of experience—browsing for jogging strollers—was perceived as novel for
participants in this study. Thus, the range of accumulated experience examined in this
study was from unique to common, and not from novel to conventional. Nonetheless, it is
informative that within this range of accumulated experience participants were able to
quickly develop a cognitive structure that aided their later recall of average quality levels.
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Even if participants formed an enduring affective representation of their search
satisfaction through additional experience in the domain, it would contribute very little to
enhancing memory for affect. Participants who lacked such a representation would still
be able to recall their experienced affect, conditional on accessing the focal browsing
sequence.

XII. Study 5: Aesthetics study
Study 5 distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity and tests hypothesis 4, the prediction
that prior indirect experiences will reduce accuracy of retrospective evaluations of affect
for conventional but not novel experiences. Consumers not only engage in direct
experiences in a domain, but also they are exposed to these experiences through indirect
sources. For instance, consumers may describe experiences verbally to each other, or
advertisements may simulate experiences prior to their occurrence. How do these indirect
experiences—which factor into familiarity—impact the accessibility of direct experiences
in the domain? Research on web-based search behavior indicates that consumers develop
false memories of product capabilities when they interact with on-line, virtual product
demonstrations (Schlosser 2006). While such exposure to information can simulate real
experiences in conventional domains, they may not lead to the same effects in novel
domains, where it is less likely that people will invoke an experience through
contemplation alone.
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In this study, on-line affect from an aesthetic experience was measured, and participants
formed an overall evaluation of affect after a delay. The focal experience was either of a
conventional or novel type. This focal experience was preceded either by a direct or
indirect experience in the same domain. I predict that for novel experiences direct
experiences will diminish accessibility more than indirect experiences. In contrast,
indirect as well as direct experiences will equally diminish accessibility for conventional
experiences.

Method
Participants and Design. Participants (n=119), undergraduate and graduate
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel
image domain) X 2 (description-based, image-based decoy experience) between-subjects
design.

Selection of Images. All images included in the focal study were pre-tested for
their perceived enjoyment and novelty as separate factors. Pre-test participants (n=234)
did not take part in the focal study and were asked to rate thirty images or thirty
descriptions of images in a 2 (conventional, novel set) X 2 (ratings of descriptions,
ratings of images) between-subjects design. Conventional images were all nature
photographs, including pictures of wild animals and landscapes. Novel images were all
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surreal paintings or photography, including bizarre artwork in the surrealism style and
photographs by Atta Kim, who specializes in long exposure photos (e.g., Kim captures
Times Square in New York by opening a lens for several hours. The resulting photograph
depicts movement that occurs through the day). From this pre-tested set, images and
descriptions were selected for the focal study to ensure that perceived novelty differed by
novelty condition and liking for viewed images would be similar by novelty condition. A
target set of eight images with similar mean enjoyment ratings (MConventional= 8.85, MNovel
= 8.14) and a decoy set of seven images with similar mean enjoyment ratings
(MConventional= 9.29, MNovel = 8.65) were selected. However, because the pre-test included
other images in the rating task, the average liking of these images may not equate with
on-line enjoyment in the focal study, which involved a smaller set of images and a
different procedure. Instead, on-line affect was measured in the focal study itself.

Focal study procedure. The focal study involved a 2 (conventional, novel image
set) X 2 (description-based, image-based decoy experience) between-subjects design. The
study took place within one lab session and proceeded in three stages: (1) a decoy
aesthetic experience, (2) target image viewing experience, and (3) delayed evaluations.
Each stage is described separately.

Stage 1: Decoy aesthetic experience
Participants were exposed to a decoy aesthetic experience at the beginning of the
lab session, which varied by condition. The decoy experiences were always in the same
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domain as the target images (i.e., nature images or surreal paintings and photographs),
and thus varied as either conventional or novel. Additionally, the decoy experience either
involved reading seven descriptions of images or involved viewing the seven images as a
between-subjects manipulation of decoy experience format. See figure 18 for examples of
images and descriptions of images viewed in the decoy experience.
FIGURE 18
Figure 18: Examples of images and description of images viewed in the decoy task of
study 5.

Conventional

Novel

A grown horse, white with brown
markings, is followed along the fields
by a young horse (foal), brown with
white markings. Both horses are
trotting at a steady pace in the
direction of sunlight, which is to the
viewer's right. The background is a
grassy field, but little of it is shown as
the frame of the image is determined
by the size of the adult horse.

This photo shows an unusual yellow
melting substance with drops falling
down and flying off the top. The
substance spans the entire horizontal
dimension of the photograph and is discshaped. The drops fly at different angles
from the disk shape, and they are more
prominent towards the right of the
image. The photo is based off of an 24hour exposure of ice melting. The photo
lens is left open for 24 hours capturing
the gradual melting of the ice.

Image

Description
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Participants who only read descriptions of decoy images were exposed to each
description for 30 seconds, after which they could move on to the next description at their
own pace. These participants were instructed as follows: “Your task will be to visualize
the image in your mind as much as possible and to focus on your enjoyment of the image.
Each description will be displayed for 30 seconds, which will allow you sufficient time to
visualize the image. After the 30 seconds have concluded, you will be asked to form a
final image in your mind and to move on to the next description.” Participants who only
viewed decoy images were exposed to each image for 5 seconds, after which they could
move on to the next image at their own pace. These participants were instructed: “As you
view each image, focus on your enjoyment of the image. Each image will be displayed
for 5 seconds. After the 5 seconds have concluded, you will be asked to move on to the
next image.” After reading all seven descriptions or viewing all seven images,
participants were asked to think about their enjoyment of the experience. Thus, although
participants thought about their enjoyment of the sequence during its course and after it
concluded, they neither explicitly provided on-line evaluations nor provided a
retrospective overall evaluation.

Stage 2: Target image viewing experience
All participants then saw a target set of eight images. These images were in the
same domain as the decoy set, and thus varied as either conventional or novel. While
viewing each image, participants were asked to provide their on-line enjoyment rating.
Specifically, they were asked, “How much do you enjoy looking at this image?” which
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they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 15 (“Very much.”). Participants
controlled the pace at which they viewed each image. Conventional images were viewed
for a similar length of time as novel images (MConventional = 3.89 seconds, MNovel = 4.34
seconds; t(119)=1.40, p=.21). Two examples of target images are provided in figure 19.

FIGURE 19
Figure 19: Examples of images viewed in the target image viewing task of study 5.

Conventional

Novel

Stage 3: Delayed evaluations
After completing the target image viewing experience, participants moved on to
other, unrelated tasks in the lab. After this delay (M=26.45 minutes) participants were
prompted to recall the target image viewing experience. Participants who had only read
descriptions of images in the decoy aesthetic experience were simply asked to recall the
eight images they viewed. Participants who had viewed a decoy set of images prior to the
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target image viewing experience were asked to recall the second set of images. To
minimize confusion, these participants were reminded that only the images from the
second set were rated on-line. All participants were then asked, “Considering these
images, overall how much did you enjoy looking at these images?” They responded on an
unmarked scale by moving a probe to a position on a line anchored by “Not at all” to
“Very much.” The probe’s singular position on the scale was translated to a number from
0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more overall enjoyment.

Participants were also asked to respond to further questions for manipulation checks and
controls. There were three ratings for overall novelty of the target image set. First,
participants were asked how often they had seen images like the ones they viewed, which
they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Never”) to 7 (“Very often”). Second, they were
asked how similar the images were to those they are exposed to in different media: They
were asked, “You are regularly exposed to all kinds of images in many different media,
such as television, film, magazine articles, advertisements, posters, art work, the Internet,
etc. How similar were the images in this study to those you are exposed to regularly?”
They responded to this second question on a scale from 1 (“Very Dissimilar”) to 7 (“Very
Similar”). Third, they were asked how knowledgeable they were about the subject matter
depicted in the images, which they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all
knowledgeable”) to 7 (“Very knowledgeable”). After these overall novelty questions,
participants rated each image on how novel it was to them. They were presented each
image one-by-one and responded to each image on a scale from 1 (“Not at all novel”) to
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15 (“Very novel”). Finally, participants rated the extent to which the decoy descriptions
or decoy images were similar to the target images in content and style; they responded to
this question on a scale from 1 (“Not at all similar”) to 10 (“Very similar”).

Results
Manipulation Checks
Novelty ratings for the nature images were much lower than these ratings for the surreal
paintings and photographs, as revealed by between-subjects differences in the three
manipulation check questions on novelty of the entire set (all t(119)>4, all p<.0001).
Further, the sum of image-by-image novelty ratings were lower for the nature images
than the surreal images (t(119)=7.51, p<.0001).

On-line and Overall Evaluations
Analyzing the mean of on-line image ratings revealed no main effect of decoy experience
format (F(1, 117)< 1), a main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=7.08, p=.009), and no
interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)< 1). Mean of on-line
enjoyment ratings were higher for the conventional, nature images (M=9.28) than for the
novel, surreal images (M=8.37). Similar results were obtained for the peak and end of online enjoyment ratings: In each case no main effect of decoy experience format and no
interaction between prior experience and novelty were obtained on these gestalt
characteristics (all F(1, 117)< 3, all p>.10), but there was a significant main effect of
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novelty in each case (both F(1, 117)>6, both p<.01). Peak of on-line enjoyment was
higher for the conventional, nature images (M=13.51) than for the novel, surreal images
(M=12.39). The final image was also enjoyed more on-line in the conventional condition
(M=10.68) than in the novel condition (M=9.31). Consistent with these on-line
differences, the same effects held for delayed overall evaluations. For overall evaluations,
there was no main effect of decoy experience format (F(1, 117)<1), and no interaction
between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)=2.73, p=.10), but a significant
main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=5.81, p=.02). Overall evaluations were higher in the
conventional condition (M=64.86) than in the novel condition (M=55.52). Together these
results suggest that the novel experience was associated with less enjoyment.

Memory-Experience Gaps
The main outcome of this study was not how novelty impacted enjoyment of the
experience but rather how novelty impacted the extent to which delayed overall
evaluations reflected on-line affect. In study 3, I examined the influence of gestalt
characteristics of the experience on overall evaluations, finding that peak intensity and
other aspects were more influential on overall evaluations if the experience was unique
versus if it was common. That approach, isolating gestalt characteristics in the analysis,
could not be applied to study 5. In study 5 each characteristic was confounded with an
individual image, which varied by novelty condition. For instance, if the end of the
sequence was more influential on overall evaluations for the novel versus conventional
sequence, it could not be resolved whether this result stems from greater accessibility of

117
novel images or greater accessibility of the specific image viewed at the end of each
sequence. As such, in study 5 I compared average on-line ratings of enjoyment with
delayed overall evaluations of enjoyment. On-line evaluations, which were on a 15-point
scale, were translated into the same scale for overall evaluations, which were on a 100point scale. The difference between overall evaluations and mean on-line evaluations
served as the memory-experience gap (see also Miron-Shatz, Stone, and Kahneman 2009
for a similar approach). This measure captures participants’ accuracy in recalling their
on-line affect.

In one analysis of memory-experience gaps, I examined actual differences between online and overall evaluations of enjoyment, which measures directional bias in recall for
experienced affect. However, this measure had a major limitation: Positive and negative
differences canceled each other out, resulting in very small effect sizes. Indeed, the mean
value of the memory experience gap (M=1.18) was not significantly different from zero
(t(121)=0.77, p=.43). Further, analyzing this measure revealed no main effect of decoy
experience format (F(1, 117)=1.82, p=.18), no main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=0.71,
p=.40), and no interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)=1.16,
p=.20), see figure 20. In the novel condition the pattern of means suggests that reading
decoy descriptions earlier resulted in the target image viewing experience being
perceived as more positive in retrospect, whereas viewing decoy images earlier pulled
down retrospective evaluations. However, these directional biases are very small and may
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stem from differences in general error in recall of affect rather than differences in
directional bias.
FIGURE 20
Study 5: Mean Memory-Experience gap
Figure 20: Mean memory-experience gaps in study 5 as a function of decoy experience
format and novelty of the sequence. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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In an alternative analysis, I studied the absolute value of differences between overall
evaluations and on-line ratings of enjoyment. This absolute difference captures the extent
to which delayed overall evaluations departed from on-line evaluations—a measure of
how well participants were able to access the target experience. This measure revealed no
main effect of decoy experience format and no main effect of novelty (both F(1, 117)<1),
but a significant interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1,
117)=7.37, p=.008), see figure 21. In the conventional image condition, absolute memory
experience gaps were higher when provided a sequence of image descriptions beforehand
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(M=14.94) and lower when provided a sequence of other conventional images prior to
the target image set (M=9.25; t(54)=2.30, p=.026). On the other hand, in the novel image
condition, absolute memory experience gaps were lower when provided a sequence of
image descriptions beforehand (M=11.81) than when provided a sequence of other novel
images prior to the target image set (M=16.03; t(63)=1.6, p=.11). The interaction held
even when controlling for how similar the decoy images and descriptions were to the
images in the target set (F(1, 116)=7.22, p=.008).
FIGURE 21
Study 5: Mean Absolute Memory-Experience gap
Figure 21: Mean absolute memory-experience gaps in study 5 as a function of decoy
experience format and novelty of the sequence. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
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Discussion
This study examined how direct and indirect experiences in a domain impact the
accessibility of experiences in retrospective evaluations. The results revealed some
effects that were expected and one that was unexpected. For novel experiences, direct
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experiences were more influential than indirect experiences in diminishing accessibility,
as revealed by higher absolute memory-experience gaps when participants were exposed
to a decoy image viewing experience. However, for conventional experiences, having
been exposed to a decoy description experience did interfere with memory for
experienced affect, as demonstrated by a high absolute memory-experience gap in this
condition. This finding helps to distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity: Whereas indirect
experiences in a domain figure into familiarity, they are less influential in novelty.
Indirect experiences increase interference only if an experience is conventional, and not if
the experience is novel.

An unexpected result occurred in the conventional experience condition: Participants who
viewed a decoy set of images prior to the target set were actually more accurate in their
recall for affect than participants in any other condition. The absence of a neutral
condition, in which no prior experience of any type would be provided, was a limitation
in the study’s design. The neutral condition would help to resolve whether the absolutememory experience gap was reduced through direct experience in the conventional
domain or widened through indirect experience in this domain. Since the experimental
manipulations do not lend an explanation, I can only conjecture as to why the earlier
experience enhanced recall for affect. One possibility is that the earlier direct experience
in the domain increased involvement in the target experience. Another possibility is that
participants had enduring affective representations towards nature images. Recent
exposure to a set of nature images cued these knowledge structures, which aided their
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learning of affect for the target experience. These possibilities are intriguing, but they
would require a different design to tease apart. Aside from a neutral condition, the study
could involve a manipulation of timing of evaluation (immediate versus after a delay) to
examine if encoding versus retrieval contribute to the phenomenon.

Another limitation in this study was differences in affective intensity across conditions.
In this study, participants enjoyed the conventional, nature image sequence more than the
novel, surreal paintings and photographs. Prior research suggests that novelty could
reduce enjoyment because novel experiences are experienced less fluently. Alternatively,
this main effect could be a result of the particular stimuli selected. Although this main
effect was not the focus of the analysis, it is still important to ensure more similar liking
of the target images to equalize involvement in the experience. Moreover, decoy
descriptions can be closely calibrated so that they cover the same content. These
possibilities must be addressed in future studies.

XIII. Conclusion and General discussion
A. Summary of findings
Consumers are constantly faced with decisions of whether to engage in experiences,
including leisure activities, shopping visits, and service encounters. These decisions are
often based on consumers’ overall evaluations of past experiences. As was noted at the
outset of this dissertation, some of consumers’ past experiences are conventional and
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others are novel. In fact, as today’s marketplace grows more abundant and varied,
consumers have many available experiences that they would perceive as novel. As such,
it is all the more important to understand the role of novelty in overall evaluations of
experiences, as was pursued in this dissertation. Through five studies I demonstrated the
following results:

Study 1:

Supporting hypothesis 1, the beginning intensity of an experiences was

more influential on overall evaluations if it was novel compared to if it was
conventional. This study established the basic effect of novelty: Novelty led to
enhanced accessibility and greater weighting in overall evaluations of affect.
Study 2:

Supporting hypothesis 2a, the end intensity of an experience influenced

immediate evaluations regardless of its novelty, but end intensity influenced
delayed evaluations only if the end was novel. This study established that novel
aspects have a more enduring influence on overall evaluations of affect.
Study 3:

Supporting hypothesis 2b, delayed overall evaluations were more accurate,

reflecting on-line affect, if the entire experience was unique versus if it was
common. This study provided evidence for the interference mechanism.
Study 4:

Supporting hypothesis 3, prior experience led to enhanced memory for

presented information. Participants had more accurate recall for average quality
levels when the experience was common compared to when the experience was
unique. This study revealed differences in overall evaluations of affect versus
retrospective judgments of presented attributes.
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Study 5:

Supporting hypothesis 4, indirect exposure to experiential information

interfered with overall evaluations of conventional but not novel experiences.
This study distinguished novelty from unfamiliarity.

These studies involved different stimulus domains: annoying sounds (studies 1 and 2),
pleasant images (studies 3 and 5), and browsing sequences (study 4). Studies involved
different forms of overall evaluations: overall evaluations of unpleasantness (studies 1
and 2), enjoyment (studies 3 and 5), satisfaction (study 4), and quality of options (study
4). They also varied in their manipulation of novelty, either by pre-testing stimuli for
their perceived novelty and presenting different type of stimuli (studies 1, 2, and 5), or by
providing different amounts of accumulated experience prior to a focal episode (study 3),
or by providing different amounts of accumulated experience after a focal episode but
prior to the delayed overall evaluation (study 4).

B. Theoretical contributions to the snapshot model
The present investigation provides a number of important theoretical contributions to
research on overall evaluations of extended experiences. First, at a very basic level, this
dissertation identifies novelty as a factor that enhances accessibility of experiences or
aspects of experiences. Much of the past research on extended experiences has revealed
how memorial factors influence overall evaluations. The present work augments this set
of factors to include novelty—a property that depends not on the relative positioning and
intensity within the episode, but instead on stimulus and conceptual differences. I show
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that the effect of novelty on accessibility in overall evaluations is not always positive, and
I examine moderators of novelty’s influence. The specific set of moderators (e.g., timing
of evaluation, form of evaluation, complexity of affective experience) is peculiar to
novelty and may not apply to other accessibility factors, such as serial positioning and
intensity. As such, the study of novelty reveals effects that were not anticipated by
previous research on overall evaluations.

Second, identifying the role of novelty in overall evaluations is critical in understanding
how evaluations of a given type of experience change with accumulated experience.
Snapshot model heuristics often lead to biases, raising the question of whether bias is
reduced through accumulated experience in a domain. For instance, people under-weight
moderate intensity moments and duration of the episode, but they over-weight improving
trends and other gestalt characteristics; these biases are at odds with rational models of
decision-making. This dissertation demonstrates that bias is not eliminated through
domain-relevant experience, but instead accumulated experience leads to additional bias
in overall evaluations of affect. As an experience ceases to be novel, immediate overall
evaluations are still based on the same heuristics, including heavy weighting of the peak
and end intensity. Moreover, with the reduction of novelty, it is harder to access
experiences for delayed overall evaluations, leading to greater error in these evaluations.

Third, in a related vein, I also demonstrate how evaluations can change with the passage
of time. The role of delay has received little attention in past work: Timing of evaluation
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has only been manipulated as a between-subjects factor in one investigation on extended
experiences (i.e., Montgomery and Unnava 2009). This dissertation provides further
support for the argument that that when evaluations are only formed after a delay they
differ from immediate evaluations, but when evaluations are repeated after a delay they
are based on similar aspects of the experience as immediate evaluations (see also
Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2008). This result highlights
the importance of studying factors that lead to more spontaneous immediate construction
of evaluations. One such factor is identified in this research: The more time people spend
deliberating on experiences post-episode, the more likely delayed evaluations will
resemble immediate evaluations.

Fourth, this dissertation links the snapshot model research to other work on consumer
learning. Excepting Zauberman et al. (2006), previous work on the snapshot model has
only studied overall evaluations of affect, neglecting how attributes are learned in
extended experiences. Whereas Zauberman et al. (2006) focused on how serialpositioning effects (i.e., primacy vs. recency) differ for informational versus hedonic
evaluations, I focus on how the effect of novelty differs by type of evaluation. I find that
novelty enhances the accessibility of experienced affect but diminishes attribute learning.
This result also adds to the broad literature that distinguishes judgments based on affect
from judgments based on cognition. I argue that because affect is a global response at a
higher-level of construal, prior experience provides little memorial advantage in learning

126
on-line affect. In contrast, because thoughts about attributes are based on a lower-level
construal, prior experience is more beneficial in learning such information.

C. Theoretical contributions to study of novelty
This dissertation improves our understanding of novelty, a construct that has been the
subject of past work in psychology as well as marketing. I modified existing definitions
of novelty in the psychology and new product literature for the purpose of studying
extended experiences. As such, I specified that novelty depends on prior, direct
experiences in a domain. Moreover, I provided evidence of how past indirect experiences
differ from direct experiences in their effect on overall evaluations. This finding
distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity. Finally, by revealing how novelty influences
overall evaluations, I identify a set of effects that may be pertinent to other areas of
consumer behavior.

D. Managerial implications
Using the knowledge gleamed from this research marketers may configure experiences
according to their desired ends. For instance, this research serves as a caveat to previous
findings in the snapshot model that emphasized the importance of peak and end intensity.
Although the peak-end rule suggests that marketers should adjust experiences so that they
have very positive peaks and ends, the present work suggests that marketers can also
devote resources to improving novel aspects of experiences. When combined with more
conventional offerings in a sequence, novel aspects will be more accessible and thus
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more influential on overall evaluations. Further, novel aspects are more likely to endure
in their influence, impacting delayed overall evaluations.

Marketers may also alter the timing of overall evaluations. Knowing that their offered
experiences are highly positive but conventional, marketers may wish to encourage
immediate overall evaluations. For instance, marketers could ask consumers to deliberate
on their experienced affect after the episode has concluded. If an experience is only
evaluated after a delay, the focal episode may not be as accessible, resulting in
evaluations regressing to the mean. When the experience is negative, such error may
benefit marketers, suggesting that they should discourage immediate evaluations and
ensure that negative aspects of the experience are not novel.

Marketers should also understand the basis by which consumers form retrospective
evaluations. If consumers are largely recalling their on-line affect when deciding whether
to repeat an experience, novelty will aid in their ability to access the episode. On the
other hand, if consumers are basing their decisions on the experience’s attributes, novel
experiences will be more poorly remembered. Marketers may also configure experiences
differently by segment of consumers. The results of this dissertation suggest that
presenting highly positive attributes will be more useful when attempting to retain expert
consumers, who have more established knowledge structures by which to recall this
information. On the other hand, these experienced consumers would have difficulty
accessing their on-line affect. The opposite strategy should apply to novice consumers:
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These consumers would be less able to learn attributes but more able to uniquely access
their affect derived from the focal episode.

Finally, marketers may also develop strategies to maintain the novelty of their
experiences. By offering an experience infrequently, marketers can ensure that the
stimulus and conceptual characteristics of an experience are not repeated too regularly.
On the other hand, marketers have less to worry about indirect exposure to experiences.
Presenting verbal information about aesthetic experiences will likely have little impact on
how novel a new experience will be. Instead, such indirect exposure might drum up
interest in the new experience prior to trial.

E. Future extensions
Prior investigations on overall evaluations have concluded with calls for further research
on extended experiences, including work on different experiential domains and
methodologies. I second their encouragement for future research in this area, and
included some extensions to the snapshot model in the earlier literature review section on
unresolved issues. Rather than re-iterating these directions, I offer a few ideas which
would be useful for understanding the phenomena emphasized in the present
investigation.
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Methodology
One methodological consideration in research on overall evaluations is how to capture
on-line affect. I employed three approaches: measuring on-line affect during a repeated
presentation of the experience (study 1), manipulating on-line affect (studies 2, 4), and
measuring on-line affect during the experience itself (studies 3, 5). The repeated
presentation method from study 1 offers a new option for future studies. As I addressed in
the discussion of study 1, there is a need for further work on how a repeated presentation
of an affective experience differs from the actual experience. Such research will provide
better guidelines on when this technique would be justified.

Measuring on-line affect during the experience may have influenced the results of study
3. Consistent with past work, study 3 demonstrated that the experience’s trend had little
impact on overall evaluations, and this may have occurred because on-line affect was
measured (Ariely and Zauberman 2000). However, the decision to directly measure online affect was centered on the cohesiveness of the affective experience and how likely it
would be to invoke momentary evaluations (see Ariely and Carmon 2000). Whereas
studies 1 and 2 involved continuous experiences (annoying sounds), study 3 involved an
experience with discrete elements (fractal images), which provided greater justification
for on-line measurement. Nonetheless, further work is needed to help determine whether
on-line measurement of affect is appropriate in a given context. In particular, there is
limited literature on what evaluative thoughts are naturally evoked during extended
experiences.
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In this dissertation, I found that overall evaluations were not always spontaneously
constructed. Spontaneous construction of evaluations is less relevant for a loose
collection of stimuli, as were sequenced together in these studies. Future research may
provide insight on when overall evaluations arise for different experiential contexts.
Some factors that may influence whether people will spontaneously construct an overall
evaluation include prevailing norms in the consumption domain, how coherent the
affective experience is, and whether the overall evaluation is perceived to be a useful
input for future decisions. Moreover, as I suggested in the discussion of study 2, future
research could examine when delay-repeated evaluations would differ from immediate
evaluations through different ways of measuring overall evaluations.

The effect of delay on overall evaluations found in this dissertation raises the issue of
how long of a delay is necessary to demonstrate differences in overall evaluations over
time, driven by novelty. In studies 2, 4, and 5 approximately 30 minutes was a sufficient
delay, whereas in study 3 only 5 minutes was necessary. Although different delay
intervals were not tested in any one study, I believe that the effective delay interval will
depend on the nature of the extended experience as well as the delay. For instance, the
annoying sounds task was both longer and more intrusive than the fractal image viewing
task. The former experience may have had more sensory information than the latter. As
such, study 2 required a longer delay to show impaired memory for the experience. On
the other hand, the fractal image viewing task from study 3 was followed by experiences

131
that would more directly interfere with retrieval of previously experienced affect: After
participants viewed the fractals they engaged in other artistic experiences, including
listening to a classical music piece and reading poems. This richer delay interval may
have accelerated memory interference in study 3. Further research assigning different
delays—both in time and in kind—in the same study may provide a more precise
understanding of the time course of novelty’s effect on overall evaluations.

Measuring novelty may be more nuanced in future research. I asked participants for
general measures of novelty, but future researchers may be interested in the perceived
novelty of specific features of affective experiences. For more complex experiences,
including experiences of mixed valence or mixed sensory modality, novelty may have
differential impact on overall evaluations depending on which characteristics are
perceived to be novel. This greater complexity may require future research on novelty to
have more comprehensive pre-tests of stimuli.

Diagnosticity
One facet of the snapshot model not examined in the studies was the role of diagnosticity
in evaluations. The results are more parsimoniously explained by accessibility rather than
diagnosticity. For instance, that evaluations change over time within a study session
cannot be explained by novel aspects being more or less diagnostic for overall
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evaluations. Nonetheless, I can offer some conjectures on why novel aspects may be
perceived as more diagnostic for overall evaluations in other contexts.

One way in which novel aspects may be more diagnostic for overall evaluations is when
experiences are pursued for their novelty. If the motivation for engaging in an experience
is to try something new, consumers may focus on novel aspects, which are connected to
their goals. Alternatively, novel aspects may be more diagnostic due to conversational
norms. According to Gricean maxims, the pragmatics of natural language require people
to be informative and relevant (Grice 1957). When asked to evaluate an experience in
retrospect, considering novel aspects may be particularly informative to others, who may
be inquiring about experiences for vicarious learning or curiosity. As such, if overall
evaluations will be used to communicate value to others, as occurs with word-of-mouth
recommendations, conversational norms may aggravate the extent to which overall
evaluations depend on novel aspects. Future research can examine how overall
evaluations differ when they are communicated to others versus when they are used for
one’s own purposes.

A different way of approaching diagnosticity is by examining how diagnostic overall
evaluations are to decisions, and whether the impact of overall evaluations on decisions
depends on the novelty of the experience. For instance, when deciding whether to repeat
a conventional experience, consumers may rely on their perception of the entire category
of experiences rather than their evaluation for a particular episode. In contrast, in novel
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domains, which have fewer past episodes and more unstable category perceptions,
consumers may rely on their overall evaluation for a recent past episode. Novelty may
also be regarded as an orthogonal evaluative dimension for decisions. In research on
aesthetic judgments, novelty is a valued trait which concerns the amount of perceived
innovativeness (Cho and Schwarz 2006; Hart and Jacoby 1973; Hekkert, Sneiders, and
van Wieringen 2003). Consumers may balance their goal of maximizing utility (i.e., by
engaging in experiences with superior overall evaluations) with their goal of experiencing
novelty. Thus, the novelty of an experience can mitigate the impact of overall evaluations
on decisions.

Informational and hedonic evaluations
Further differences between informational and hedonic evaluations of experiences can
also be tested in future research. In study 4, evaluation type was manipulated through
different prompts. In an alternative test, participants’ goals can be manipulated so that
decisions are based either on presented attributes or on-line affect. For instance, when
making decisions in specified contexts, consumers may be more likely to form
evaluations based on presented attributes. In cases where consumers seek to maximize
enjoyment, retrospective evaluations may be based purely on past on-line affect. Future
research could also examine if consumers weight affect or presented attributes differently
in decisions depending on the novelty of the experience.
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Another promising line of research would examine when prior experience aids in learning
of experienced affect. In this dissertation, I found that a small accumulation of experience
in a domain did not aid in learning of experienced affect (i.e., for the browsing
experiences in study 4), but substantial differences in accumulated experiences may have
resulted in differential learning of experienced affect (i.e., for the image viewing
experience in study 5). This result may stem from changes in the role of prior experience
across the continuum of accumulated experience. As such, future studies may investigate
the extent of affective learning at different points in the continuum. Alternatively, the
result could arise from differences in experiential domains. For instance, though search
satisfaction is a relatively simple characteristic to recall, enjoyment of a sequence of
aesthetic images is more complex and may require more deliberation. In the latter case,
an enduring affective representation may have real benefits on how affective experience
is accessed.

Evaluations of singular experiences
This dissertation examines experiences that extend over time or comprise sequences of
outcomes. Will the same effects hold for evaluations of singular experiences, such as a
taste of a jelly bean (e.g., Novemsky and Ratner 2003) or assessments of an object, such
as a really new product (e.g., Alexander et al. 2008; Hoeffler 2003; Moreau et al. 2001)?
One phenomenon of interest in this dissertation is the role of novelty in how aspects are
weighted in overall evaluations. For the experiences studied in this work, aspects are
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parts of an extended interval or one outcome in a sequence of outcomes. For singular
experiences or objects, an aspect could be one feature of the experience (e.g., texture for
a jelly bean) or object (e.g., attribute of a new product). Novelty may similarly impact the
accessibility of these features. While evidence from this dissertation indicates that people
also find novel aspects diagnostic to overall evaluations of extended experiences, more
work will be needed to study if novel features are perceived as diagnostic for evaluations
of singular experiences or objects. Another phenomenon studied in the present
investigation is the role of novelty in accuracy of recalling past experiences. These
findings are promising in their generalization to singular experiences and objects. The
supported theories do not require experiences to extend over time in order find
interference with other experiences or learning of attributes and affect. Thus, these effects
may be generalizable to singular cases.
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